

Across the Rhine: roses and young women

Anne-Marie Le Gloannec

Since they may eventually contribute to redrawing the map of the European continent, the aborted Reykjavik summit and the INF agreement will possibly be considered by future historians the most dramatic events of the late '80s in this part of the world. The former has indeed brought about a global rethinking and restructuring of Soviet-American military and political relations, and the latter is the first-ever agreement aimed not merely at preventing, slowing down or reducing new developments in nuclear weapons in scope and number, but at withdrawing and scrapping them before they become technically obsolete.

But the most challenging and daring development of this decade on the European strategic scene is represented by the "new beginning" of Franco-German military co-operation, characterized by both France's pledge to defend the Federal Republic of Germany and the agreement to set up joint instruments for this purpose. Both the pledge and the agreement are momentous facts, even if Franco-German military co-operation has actually been conceived by both sides as a policy of small steps, of incremental changes and gradual *rapprochement*, because of diverging doctrines anchored in different foreign policy frammentworks. Both pledge and agreement are also all the more amazing since it was already been attempted once, some twenty years ago.

The surprising diplomatic results of that attempt, marking the apex of post-war reconciliation, bore however no concrete results, and military co-operation between the two enemies-turned-allies has since remained dormant. Hardly had

the Elysée Treaty been signed, in 1963, by the French and the German governments, than it faded out, "like roses and young women", as De Gaulle put it. Already at the moment of ratifying it, the West German *Bundestag* thought it necessary to add a preamble stressing the FRG's commitment to the Atlantic Alliance, which largely devoided of meaning the Treaty itself; and France's subsequent withdrawal from NATO's military framework, completed in 1966, finally obliterated it. But its lack of success cannot only be traced back to the events that coincided with its signing: there were also more profound reasons. As the German historian Michael Stürmer recently put it, the Germans had looked upon the treaty as a conclusion, or as the seal to their country's re-integration into the West, into the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community, whereas De Gaulle had intended to use it to further France's - and Europe's - independence and grandeur, a beginning more than a conclusion, a departure instead of a seal.¹

For almost twenty years, then, the Treaty laid dormant as De Gaulle's successors, unable to solve the contradictions left by the Grand Old Man, preferred to withdraw to national categories, while the West Germans insisted on nothing short of France's re-integration in the military organization of the Alliance. Yet ever since the beginning of the '80s, a number of moves have been undertaken to revitalize the Treaty and to strengthen French and German military co-operation.

The task is not easy: indeed, in spite of the fact that in recent years the French have quietly increased their co-operation with NATO, which, in turn, facilitated Franco-German co-operation, it is a daring attempt. Doctrines and habits remain wide apart, and even new areas of divergences have appeared, in particular as far as disarmament processes and procedures are concerned. Moreover, in paradoxical ways hardly perceived outside France, French efforts to narrow down divergence in one area have opened up new possible gaps in some other areas. One could therefore legitimately wonder whether Franco-German co-operation is impossible, an attempt that both doctrine and diplomacy thwart. Or can it be turned into a success story in spite of all the dilemmas and differences?

An act of will and incremental changes

In the beginning there was will... The decision to re-activate the military provisions of the Elysée Treaty was agreed upon by both French and German

heads of government, by Giscard D'Estaing and Schmidt, as the two later contended,² and this was subsequently pursued by their successors, Mitterrand and Kohl. Yet it was French authorities and diplomacy, as former victors and initiators of post-war reconciliation and as possessors of an independent nuclear *force de frappe*, who alone made the decision to take the first step, to risk the offer. They alone had the freedom of manoeuvre to move forward, in spite of the fact that up till then they had tied their own hands by insisting on the need to maintain above all other considerations.

France's decision to approach the West Germans could therefore only come at the conclusion of the domestic political debate on how to modify their relationship with the former enemy, after forty years of post-war order. And indeed, at the beginning of the '80s, the French were ready to modify subtly, if not drop altogether, their hexagonal, i.e. national, perception of security issues. The rallying of the two leftist parties, the Communists in 1977 and the Socialists in 1978, to the notion of deterrence, which they had previously fiercely opposed, had put an end to an enduring debate, and created the bi-partisan situation that was a pre-requisite for this change. The need to uphold nuclear weapons as credible instruments of deterrence and the undesirability and superfluity of re-integrating France into NATO's military network were henceforth agreed upon by all French political parties. This allowed - paradoxically enough, if one considers French "force the frappe" as a nuclear Maginot line - the abandonment of France's isolation, and in particular, its opening up towards West Germany.

The move did not, however, go without raising discussion. Just as the then Prime Minister Jacques Chirac in 1975 and Général Méry in 1976, who had both wanted to open up the French sanctuary, were forced to withdraw their proposals, some of the "extreme" forms of co-operation advocated by French ruling *élites* in 1983-84 met with strong domestic criticism, in particular those aiming at sharing nuclear weapons with the West Germans. In spite of the fact that the extension of French nuclear protection, in some way or another, to West German territory would have represented a bold improvement of stanz, West German officials remained almost silent on this issue, constrained as the Federal Republic is by international limitations and plagued as it has been ever since the beginning of the '80s by a vociferous pacifist movement. Domestic dissent in France at the *élite* level, and West German mass-demonstrations, were a meaningful measure of divergences in public moods and attitudes in the two countries, and led to mutual misunderstandings. The French feared that the

Federal Republic might start drifting away from its pro-Western stand, a fear that has not abated with time, even though the West German pacifist movement has lost its momentum. And as a reaction to that danger, the desire to tie the destinies of France and West Germany as tightly as possible is now shared by all French political forces: from the present Defence Minister Chevènement, a left-wing Socialist, to Conservative former Prime Minister Chirac, the consensus is strong, and, for years to come, the same principle will triumph for the same reasons.

Whoever wants to comment sarcastically on French fears would be well advised to look at West Germany's political *élites* and leaders: from Joschka



Fischer, a vocal Green representative and former Minister of Environmental Protection of the Land of Hesse, and Peter Glotz, former administrative secretary of the SPD, to Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the Minister of Foreign

Affairs, and to Chancellor Kohl, politicians have warned in recent times against the temptation of a *deutscher Sonderweg*, "a special path for Germany", a reference to both Germany's diplomatic evolution from the early 19th century to 1945, and to a possible policy of equidistance between East and West. Helmut Kohl's warm acceptance of increased Franco-German co-operation, his own, first-time initiative concerning the creation of a Franco-German brigade,

as well as other foreign policy measures, in particular within the European Community, signal an eagerness to anchor West Germany to the Western Alliance even more strongly than Adenauer did.

Germany, however, is not unanimous. While most German political leaders have been stressing the importance of Franco-German co-operation as a means of reinforcing the identity and autonomy of the whole of Europe (a formula put forward by the SPD, though after it left office), the Chancellor and his Foreign Minister have recently been speaking of the irreversibility of the Franco-German alliance, and, at the same time, have also been promoting *Deutschlandpolitik*, (i.e. co-operation with East Germany) and *Ostpolitik*, even though not to the point wished by both left and right. Thus a double asymmetry characterizes the Franco-German partnership. Firstly, while France has increasingly been looking at the Federal Republic as her primary partner, the latter has privileged both *Westpolitik* and *Ostpolitik*. And secondly, while all, or almost all French leaders have ever since the '80s at the latest attached a primary importance to the Federal Republic of Germany, the same does not apply to the latter's interest in France.

The domestic French debate of the '80s led to a twin series of declarations and measures which met some West German concerns and demands. For almost two decades the West Germans had reproached the French for considering the German soil as their *glacis*, perhaps over-emphasizing the fact that France did not feel committed to automatic intervention in case of an attack across the Elbe river. As a consequence, they consistently and repeatedly asked for France's participation in the forward defence of the Federal Republic of Germany. Without re-integrating NATO's defence system, the French have progressively come to meet German wishes up to a certain point.³ After a series of declarations including, in June 1985, admission by the then Minister of Defence, Charles Hernu, that both countries have "common security interests" after France's underwriting of the WEU "platform",⁴ and the then Prime Minister Jacques Chirac went furthest last December when he recognized that France would engage her forces "immediately and without reservations", if an attack were launched on the Federal Republic: "There cannot be a battle of France and a battle of Germany".⁵ President Mitterrand later endorsed this declaration, adding that "the German-French alliance is effective whatever may happen", though he limited the automatic engagement of France by West Germany's side to conventional forces. Any decision as far as nuclear weapons are concerned, he stressed, lay with the President.⁶ This indeed falls short of the solemn engagement - something similar to Kennedy's declaration, "Ich bin

ein Berliner” - that West Germans, including Helmut Schmidt and Egon Bahr, have been requesting and that some French experts have advocated in recent years.⁷

Long before the latter official statements, the French government had somewhat anticipated the evolution of public mood and *élite* discussions and had created an instrument, the Rapid Action Force [*Force d'Action Rapide*, FAR] intended to supplement the French forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany, were the latter attacked. More flexible than the troops already stationed on German soil, and capable of participating, in a certain sense, in the forward defence of Germany,⁸ the FAR would “permit us”, as the then Defence Minister Hernu put it, “infinitely better than today, to commit ourselves alongside our allies, as soon as we make the decision, at a time and place that we will chose, if the occasion should arise”⁹ - a rhetorical attempt to square the circle of reasserting at the same time France’s commitment to defend the FRG, and her independence of decision.

Later practical steps that avoided the pitfalls of rhetoric showed in full light the actual French willingness to stand by the side of the eastern ally. As the American analyst David Yost underlines, “the September 1987 *Kecker Spatz - Moineau Hardi* [Bold Sparrow] manoeuvres were the first in which major units of the FAR based in France crossed the Rhine with so much material and to such a great depth into Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg”, well beyond the Dortmund-Munich line, and under the “operational control” (although not under the operational command) of a West German commander.

The joint manoeuvres, a signal even more than a just symbol of France’s determination, were nevertheless marred by severe shortcomings, both political (namely the cancellation of invitations to NATO officials, which the French insisted upon) as well as technical, including questions of inter-operability of French and NATO material, of training, logistical problems, etc. From a technical point of view, the FAR proved to be a limited instrument, heterogeneous as it is, with a small number of combat units, command centres, and logistic support units entrusted with various possible tasks, outside Europe as well as in Europe.

The common brigade, which Chancellor Kohl called forth and which will be set up this year under the auspices of a newly created Franco-German Council of Defence and Security, will not solve these problems, since it will be

restricted in size (4,200 men) and bound to be plagued by legal and administrative problems, not to mention linguistic ones.¹⁰ However, in contrast to some West German commentators who consider the glass of Franco-German strategic co-operation to be half empty, one might as well, more optimistically, deem it half full.¹¹ Joint manoeuvres and a common brigade perform a double function, practical and symbolic. They help to bring out the problems raised by the co-operation of French and German troops in the operational-tactical area and at the same time stress the existence of a common Franco-German area of security interests. What these developments represent, then, is the core of something yet to emerge.

Missiles and other weapons

While Franco-German co-operation in the production of armaments was most successful from the late '50s to the late '60s, the situation is presently "positive by default"; according to French civil service sources, no important bi-lateral project is underway except for the anti-tank helicopter, which has proved to be a long, exhausting and even dramatic story.

The common study phase was launched last autumn by former Defence Ministers, André Giraud and Manfred Wörner, after years of fierce clashes among industrial firms and apparently technical approaches. The French and the Germans disagreed on questions such as whether there should be one engine or two, side-by-side or tandem seating, or again on the question of whether the Europeans should develop their own avionics or buy American.

The failures or delays of the past years have created a climate of reciprocal suspicions and brought to light divergences between the two countries.¹² Although the '80s cannot be compared with the '60s in terms of an alleged choice between the United States and France, Paris still has the feeling that, for whatever reason, whether technical (e.g. the availability of avionic packages), financial, or political (e.g. the wish not to offend the Americans, etc.), when the chips are down, the West Germans would choose to buy American. Yet the French certainly do bear some responsibility for occasionally presenting projects that are suited mainly to their own needs. All the issues, technical and economic, financial and political, are complex, even ambiguous and double-sided. The French fight both for Europe and for their own interests, the West Germans seem to think more in terms of Alliance and financial costs. To caricature somewhat, the French think more of politics, and the Germans more of economics.

Moreover, nuclear weapons and strategies have been a constant source of difference between the two countries, from the late '50s up to now. The only agreement in this field has been that disagreement is inevitable. The French terminated the 1957 Franco-German-Italian agreement to produce nuclear weapons in common and decided to develop their own *force de frappe*. The *force de frappe* enhanced France's independence in two ways: because it increased its leverage with respect to friends and foes alike, and because all French Presidents have stressed that decision-making in this area cannot be shared. But this has brought about German reproaches that the French were building their nuclear independence behind the conventional shield provided by Germany.

This French habit to go it alone could explain the German request for an extension of France's nuclear guarantee, a request that was formulated by Helmut Schmidt in his famous *Bundestag* speech in June 1984 and later by other West German leaders, like Alfred Dregger, the head of the Conservative parliamentary group or again Egon Bahr, the father of *Ostpolitik* and a Social-



Voltaire and Emperor Frederick II.

Democratic expert for disarmament problems. This request has found a positive response among leading French figures such as former Prime Minister Laurent Fabius, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, now Defence Minister, or Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. Hence also the above-mentioned reference in Chirac's December speech to France's commitment by the side of the West Germans should the FRG be attacked, later qualified by Mitterrand's comment that the decision to resort to nuclear weapons cannot but remain an exclusive power of the President of France.

More recently, due to France's limited nuclear capabilities and the evolution of West German public mood and attitudes, in particular an increased discontent and distrust regarding nuclear deterrence, a majority of West German leaders and commentators have come to pay growing attention to the possibility of consultation, or even co-operation in the question of targeting tactical nuclear weapons that would, as they contend, hit German soil.

French answers have been hesitating and ambiguous, to say the least. In January, 1986, François Mitterrand announced that he would consult the West German allies about nuclear weapons launched from German territory "within the limits imposed by the extreme rapidity of such a decision". But he reasserted that "the decision cannot be shared", a long awaited pronouncement that the West Germans did not really hail, presumably because it fell short of their expectations.¹³ More concrete steps have been avoided, and whenever the problem might have been raised, e.g. with FAR deployment, it has often been prudently put in parentheses by both parties.¹⁴ France's official position is still that French nuclear doctrine applies to all French forces, wherever they are.

Defence Minister Hernu did suggest in 1982-83 that the future Hades missile might be deployed under a special command, divorced from French forces, a solution that would allow a greater flexibility in the resort to nuclear weapons without theoretically depriving French forces of nuclear cover. François Mitterrand's ambiguous statement last October probably reflects the same position: "Nothing", he said, "permits anyone to assert that France's ultimate warning to the aggressor would be delivered on German soil... France's nuclear strategy is addressed to the aggressor and to him solely, in order to deter him".¹⁵ Whether this means abandoning certain nuclear weapons altogether, scrapping, for instance, the Hades, or lengthening their range and building in particular new weapons, remains uncertain. Meanwhile, in the autumn of 1986, Jacques Chirac stressed the connection between conventional

Anne-Marie Le Gloannec is a research fellow at the Centre d'Etudes et de Relations Internationales of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, and visiting Professor at the John Hopkins University, Bologna, Italy.

**Has published various articles and two books:
1961: *Un Mur à Berlin*, Edition Complexe, Brussels, 1985;
La Nation Orpheline, Ramsay, Paris, forthcoming.**

and nuclear weapons, at the same time making the distinction between short-range nuclear weapons, (which he dubbed tactical rather than pre-strategic), and strategic weapons.

These subtle nuances show the present important, though almost mute, differences between the strategic views of the left and the right, between Socialists and Conservatives. The former, or at least François Mitterrand, want to raise the nuclear threshold, in order to solve the problem of tactical nuclear targeting. They then come back to the purity of deterrence and to the old notion of massive retaliation, withdrawing theoretically into the national territory. The latter, with various shades and nuances, stress the importance of tactical nuclear weapons as the intermediate tool of flexible retaliation, as a step of the ladder which has been partly destroyed by the INF agreement and which should broader defence scheme to be reconstructed whittin a by France together with the other European allies. A spokesman of former Defence Minister André Giraud suggested in July 1987 the possible deployment of Hades and neutron bombs on German soil.¹⁶ This means, in other words, that the left, with Mitterrand, is tempted by an all-or-nothing logic, while, on the other hand, the Conservatives seem to be thinking of the possibility of developing European capacity for gradual response.

Yet it should not be forgotten - even though it might look confusing - that both answers to the problem of Franco-German military co-operation stem from the same concern, the concern of how to build Europe, and how to bind Germany to its Western European neighbours. Still more confusingly, both answers correspond to diplomatic views which are precisely at odds with the military doctrines that are discreetly being pursued. François Mitterrand, the nuclear

isolationist, welcomed the INF treaty and advocated further disarmament steps, thus quelling West German concern, while the Conservative supporters of a European defence system have criticized the INF agreement and even decried it as a new Munich, thus running the risk of isolating themselves from the Germans and other Europeans. While Francois Mitterrand would like to delay the modernization of short-range nuclear forces and have first negotiations on the mutual reduction of conventional arms, the Conservatives would certainly prefer an agreement reducing conventional armaments before a Short-range Nuclear Forces agreement.

Thus there are two distinct interpretations of defence and disarmament, of European co-operation and withdrawal of defence capacity on national territory, quite separate from one another.¹⁷ While these concepts have been partly developed to meet West German needs and demands and strengthen Franco-German co-operation, West Germany's own evolution might well render such efforts more difficult or irrelevant and enlarge the cracks in the already damaged French consensus.

Doctrines and interpretations

On the one hand, the coalition that presently forms the German government is deeply troubled by a number of disagreements which have come into the forefront since May 1987 and after the psycho-drama that has accompanied the double-zero option. The areas of discord pertain to defence matters as well as to other issues, including *Deutschlandpolitik*: at the beginning of 1988, Dorothea Wilms, the Minister of Inner German Affairs, and Heiner Geissler, the Secretary General of the CDU, encountered the wrath of their fellow party members, from both right and left wings, for having suggested that Germany's unity is less important than the freedom of all, Germans and non-Germans. In such a fluid context, new alignments and tenuous alliances, or occasional coincidences of approach appear between certain Social-Democrats and Conservatives. Egon Bahr, for instance, who expressed his support for Heiner Geissler's *Deutschlandpolitik* proposals, advocates a triple-zero option more or less on the same lines, although in another form and for other purposes, as Alfred Dregger and Volker R uhe, respectively President and Vice President of the Conservative parliamentary group, do.

On the other hand, during the past few years the Social-Democrats have been the most vocal proponents of a "Europeanization of Europe", that would have

Franco-German co-operation as its core. Yet, their interpretation of such a political project diverges from both the French Conservative and Socialist versions. While the more moderate Social-Democrats agree to some kind of military co-operation, however difficult a rapprochement may be in this area, they consider arms control, disarmament and a European peace order as their ultimate objectives.¹⁸ The divergences in basic defence doctrines, and in the path diplomacy should follow to implement them, are nevertheless broad enough to push the more radical of the Social-Democrats to deny all value of the Franco-German axis.¹⁹

In other words, Franco-German co-operation is difficult to manage: there are not two partners, but four, governments and oppositions, or six, including public opinion in both countries, whose future and especially long-term evolution is quite unpredictable: are the West German Conservatives going to "social-democratize" themselves further, or will the Social-Democrats move towards the center? Between defence and *détente*, will the West German public continue to prefer - as they now do - more *détente* and less defence? The odds are such that a number of French experts, who advocate more co-operation, suggest to implement it in a way that would leave options open. Thus, for instance, an airborne defence system would be preferable to the present ground-to-ground tactical nuclear weapons, because it would avoid discussion and negotiation over where to station and how to target the missiles, and therefore avoid the almost impossible choice between Charybdis and Scylla, withdrawal into national territory or sharing with the West Germans a weapon that they do not want.

But this should not lead to pessimistic conclusions. However difficult present and future collaboration may be, the glasses might yet be considered half-full rather than half-empty. There are at least two reasons for moderate optimism. Firstly, it is an undeniable fact that against all odds and difficulties, Franco-German co-operation is still functioning and even expanding into new areas; in spite of all apparent evidence of immobility, one has to come to the Galilean conclusion "*Eppur si muove!*". In other words there are, underneath the surface of everyday politics and diplomacy, deeper forces and longer-term trends that force each country towards the other. Secondly, if jealousy of others is a criterion to assess success, progress has been dramatic, since the Spaniards want to join in, and the Italians and the British combine suspicion, attraction, and proposals for co-operation in the nuclear and naval fields. And the Soviets, of all people, keep warning the Germans not to push it too far!

References

- ¹ - See Michael Stürmer: "Elysee Anniversary: Europe's future is Franco-German", in *The Wall Street Journal*, January 29, 1988. For an excellent background on Franco-German co-operation, see Nicole Gnesotto: "Le dialogue franco-allemand depuis 1954: patience et longueur de temps" in *Le Couple franco-allemand et la défense de l'Europe*, under the direction of Karl Kaiser and Pierre Lellouche, Economica, Ifri, Paris, 1986, pp. 11-30.
- ² - ... later and too late. Helmut Schmidt has admitted ever since 1982 that he and Giscard had been on the verge of making a bold move before they had to leave.
- ³ - For a German view of the fairly intense co-operation network between France on the one hand, NATO and West Germany on the other hand, see Siegfried Thielbeer: "Paris, die Nato und die Vorneverteidigung. Die sowjetischen Generäle müssen bei einem Angriff mit einer Intervention Frankreichs im Osten rechnen" in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 29, 1987. For an opposite, sceptical view, see Karl Feldmeyer: "Das Umfeld einer gemeinsamen Brigade: Eine Idee des Bundeskanzlers und die strategischen Gegebenheiten in Frankreich und der Nato" in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 22, 1987.
- ⁴ - which foresees that the members will help defend an attacked State at its borders. See the text of the communiqué October 27, 1987.
- ⁵ - Jacques Chirac: "La France et les enjeux de la sécurité européenne, Allocution du premier ministre le 12 décembre 1987 devant les auditeurs de l'Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale", in *Défense Nationale*, February 1988, pp. 9-18.
- ⁶ - Interview of the President of the Republic of France for *Le Nouvel Observateur*, Friday, December 18, 1987.
- ⁷ - See Anne-Marie Le Gloannec: "Les Allemands et la dissuasion française ou les ambiguïtés franco-allemandes" in Karl Kaiser and Pierre Lellouche *op. cit.*, p. 95; and e.g. Pierre Hassner: "Les limites du pragmatisme" in *Politique étrangère*, n. 4, 1984, p.941.
- ⁸ - but not in the forward defence system as such; See Siegfried Thielbeer: "Paris, die Nato und die Vorneverteidigung", *art. cit.*
- ⁹ - Quoted by David Yost in his detailed article: "Franco-German Defence Co-operation" in *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1988, p.174.
- ¹⁰ - For a precise discussion, see David Yost: *art. cit.*, in particular p.182.
- ¹¹ - See "Beim Manöver 'Kecker Spatz' klappt fast nichts. Die Generäle Altenburg und Galvin ausgeladen. 'Keine Änderung der Militärstrategie Frankreichs'" in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 24, 1987; and Luc Rosenzweig: "Les Manoeuvres franco-allemandes en Bavière. Seule une ferme volonté politique a permis de surmonter de sérieuses différences de points de vue" in *Le Monde*, September 25, 1987.
- ¹² - See in particular the long review and prospect by Pascal Boniface and François Heisbourg: *La Puce, les hommes et la bombe: l'Europe face aux nouveaux défis technologiques et militaires*, Hachette, Paris, 1986.
- ¹³ - See in particular the comments of the conservative newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 17, 1986.
- ¹⁴ - though the SPD has begun to criticizing this ambiguity
- ¹⁵ - See *Le Monde*, October 21, 1987.
- ¹⁶ - See *die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 23, 1987.
- ¹⁷ - See Pierre Hassner's perceptive analysis: "Un chef-d'oeuvre en péril: le consensus français sur la défense", *Esprit*, March 1988, pp. 71-82.
- ¹⁸ - See e.g. "Ehmke sieht Widersprüche zwischen Paris und Bonn in der Sicherheitspolitik. SPD-Politiker spricht sich für Zusammenfassung konventioneller Waffen aus", in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 5, 1988.
- ¹⁹ - Such as Hermann Scheer, SPD speaker on disarmament questions.