

The "New Thinking" and German Reality

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After a rather long period in which Moscow had demonstratively taken its distance from Bonn, Soviet-West German relations have grown better and better in the last three years, and this uninterrupted improvement culminated in President Richard von Weizsäcker and Chancellor Helmut Kohl paying a visit to Moscow in 1988 and then in the triumphal voyage of Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev to Bonn. Until recently, however, there still remained a feeling of dissatisfaction in the Kremlin. Although the West German government was quite ready to give moral credit to Gorbachev for his reform policy and to help him in many ways to overcome his economic difficulties, it did not play the part expected by the Russians in the solution of East-West security problems. The prospect of a change of trend in Bonn's policy only began to appear in the spring of 1989. Only then did Soviet leaders begin to hope that their change of tone with respect to the Federal Republic would at last pay off.

As late as the turn of 1988-1989, the West German attitude had still proved unsatisfactory for the Soviet side. The Federal Government seemed to accept the point of view of the leading NATO powers that a modernisation of the alliance's land-based short-range missiles was imperative, because technical reasons would make these weapons so obsolete, as to be as useless as if they had been removed. According to the prevailing Western view, this was so, quite independently of the extent to which the USSR reduced its own systems of this type. Even total dismantling of the far more numerous Soviet short-range

missiles did not seem to justify an analogous decision by NATO: such a step would indeed add up to the denuclearisation of Europe to the west of the Soviet borders, because NATO would thus leave the European theatre devoid of nuclear weapons. It would also eliminate the option of first use and, with this fact, the certainty that the USSR would be just as imperatively deterred from war as the West was by Soviet nuclear weaponry.

Bonn stood down from this consensus of the leading NATO countries when, in the spring of 1989, it opposed the decision of the Atlantic Alliance regarding the modernisation of its short-range missiles and began to plead in favour of starting negotiations for a reduction of land-based missiles as quickly as possible. Ignoring the express statement of the Federal Republic that it was not proposing a complete abolition of this weapon category, the Soviet leadership saw this plea as a reason for pushing ahead its own denuclearisation proposals. If all missile categories with a maximum range of less than 5.5 kilometres were eliminated together with the short-range rockets, which would not take into account the Soviet Union's strategic systems of variable range down to weapons of medium-range, a decisive breakthrough would have been achieved in this respect, because a nuclear deterrent based solely on aircraft would be of doubtful reliability and was therefore hardly likely to be maintained. Moreover, in view of the fact that the USSR would thus dismantle twelve times as many systems as the West, the Kremlin hoped to combine the zero option for short-range missiles with a demand that NATO should forego a substantial part of its conventional air force capacity.¹

Satisfaction

The new West German attitude thus met with Moscow's positive assessment, though this did not imply the disappearance of all Soviet reserves regarding Bonn. On the negative side, it was noted that the "ruling CDU/CSU-FDP coalition" still maintained, at least in principle, its "well-known position". In particular, it supported "the NATO concept of terror"—the Soviet bloc's polemical way of referring to the nuclear deterrent of the Western Alliance—"and consequently also the maintenance of the so-called nuclear component in the armed forces of the Western bloc". The positive aspects of the changed West German attitude seemed, however, more important. The Federal Republic was in favour of an "early start" for negotiations on land-based short-range missiles and nuclear artillery. It wanted to defer the decision regarding NATO's planned modernisation measures until 1992 and then link

this decision to the progress made up to that time in the negotiations for the reduction of nuclear and conventional armaments. From the Soviet viewpoint, however, this was associated with the setback that Bonn only wanted to reduce land-based short-range missiles, and did not seek to abolish them completely. All the same, as could be read between the lines, the correction of the West German position was assessed as a decisive step forward that would enable the USSR to push matters ahead in the direction it desired.²

In view of Germany's attitude, the NATO Council of May 30, 1988, deferred the decision about the modernisation of land-based short-range missiles until 1992 and offered to enter into negotiations about these weapon systems at a date not yet clearly defined. It did, however, make it clear that the Atlantic Alliance sticks to its idea that deterrence is the only possible war preventing strategy and, further, that it considered nuclear systems irrenounceable for the maintenance of this deterrence, so that—as can readily be deduced—a minimum of short-range missiles would have to remain. The NATO Council further declared itself ready to accept Soviet ideas regarding the inclusion of military aircraft in the Vienna negotiations (CSCE) about the limitation of conventional armed forces in Europe.³ This coincided with the Soviet viewpoint, for the USSR, basing itself on the thesis (strongly denied by the West) that NATO possessed far more aircraft than the Warsaw Pact, was calling for an overproportional reduction of NATO forces.

During his visit to Bonn in mid-June, Gorbachev voiced his "satisfaction" about this change in the Western position, expressly giving credit to the Federal Republic for its contribution in bringing about this result. The Western side had "accepted a part of our proposal regarding negotiations about tactical nuclear weapons (short-range missiles)". However, he considered the "associated conditions" to be unsatisfactory, evidently referring to the Western decision against the complete abandonment of short-range missiles, intended to contribute to the maintenance of a basis for the nuclear deterrent now extended to Europe. He acknowledged NATO readiness to negotiate about military aircraft with the remark that the Western Alliance was now at long last willing "to extend armament reductions also to its own offensive weapons and no longer to ask this exclusively of us".⁴

The Secretary General was thus basing himself on the Soviet thesis that the requested reductions in the armoured forces of the East should go hand in hand with an analogous reduction in military aircraft maintained by the West.

According to the NATO view, however, this demand for compensation is quite unjustified, because the Western air forces not only do not enjoy any numerical superiority, but are also designed and organised for defensive purposes. Accordingly, in the event of war, their mission of carrying out strikes against attacking formations by moving forward deep into the enemy's rear cannot be considered as an offensive intention. NATO fears that the Soviet demand for an overproportional reduction in this field by the West represents an attempt to weaken the West's defensive capacity, over fifty per cent of which is supposed to be protected by air, according to Soviet military leaders, thereby enhancing the East's offensive capacity.

Gorbachev made it clear in Bonn that he wanted to put pressure on the Western states to move in the direction of his own concepts even more strongly than they had done on May 30, 1989. "The problem of the complete elimination of tactical nuclear weapons must not disappear from the agenda". With this goal in mind, he insisted that negotiations about these systems should not be delayed.⁵ Since the December 1987 agreement provided for the liquidation of land-based missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometres, it is not difficult to recognise that behind this approach there is the intention of eliminating another weapon category, the very one on which NATO's deterrent concept is based. At the press conference called on the occasion of his visit, Gorbachev therefore criticised the principle of the Western decision. Ultimately, so he said, the Western attitude still reflected the philosophy of the Cold War. With this remark he evidently alluded once more to the fact that the Western Alliance stuck to its deterrent policy, which he deemed to be "confrontation-oriented".

Moscow's new *Deutschlandpolitik*...

As far as the Kremlin is concerned, the important feature of the changed attitude of the Federal Republic is represented by the German view that NATO's modernisation proposals are to be subordinated to East-West negotiations. Just as on the occasion of the controversy about the stationing of land-based medium-range missiles between 1979 and 1983, this would make it possible—as the Soviet side was hoping—to exert a lasting influence on the political processes within the Western Alliance.⁶ In keeping with the 1979-83 model, it could thus be possible to convey the impression to the Western public that only the Kremlin was ready to seek an understanding over the matters at hand, at the same time reproaching the Western governments for a lack of good

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will whenever they sought to oppose Soviet concepts. The Soviet leadership also hoped that the West German government might initiate a far-reaching conflict with its NATO partners and adopt some of the deviating approaches of the SPD opposition. In this way, the West German refusal of the nuclear strategy hitherto adopted by the West, and which had commenced among the Social Democrats during the missile-stationing debate at the beginning of the 1980s, might extend to the ruling Conservative-Liberal coalition and thus embrace the whole of the political spectrum in the Federal Republic.

Indeed, ever since the turn of 1983-1984, the Kremlin had sought to promote such a development. At first it had ignored the announced "glaciation period" and had expressed its willingness to cooperate with the CDU/CSU-FDP government after its victory in the missile controversy. Between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic, so it was said at the time, there existed no problems that could bar the way to mutual understanding, though their relations would of course improve if the West German side were to think more of its own interests and show "greater independence" with respect to the USA.

When it became clear that this devious strategy brought no fruit, the Soviet leadership decided in the spring of 1984 to stake its money on the Social Democratic opposition and to put the Conservative-Liberal coalition into cold storage. This was evidently based on the hope that one could help the Social Democrats to reach understandings in their disarmament "negotiations" with Communist parties in the East and thus create a peace image for them in the eyes of the Western public, which would have contributed considerably to ensuring their success in the German elections of January 1987.

In the spring of 1986, however, it was clear to the Soviet leadership that this calculation would miss its mark as well, so that the line previously adopted

towards West Germany began to appear as self-defeating. The Soviet Union was cold-shouldering the circles that continued to have political say in the Federal Republic, and this without making any headway elsewhere. In this way the Federal Republic was being driven into the arms of NATO policy, and this could certainly not be in the Soviet interest. Relations with the government coalition in Bonn had therefore to be intensified, so that on this basis it would eventually become possible to appeal to West German tendencies in the direction of greater "independence" with respect to the Western Alliance.

...and NATO-Politik

It is not a matter of chance that Soviet approval of the West German change of stance in the spring of 1989 contained a limiting reference to continued support of Western deterrent policy. Ever since Gorbachev's programme speech on January 15, 1986 and the 27th Congress of the CPSU, which was held shortly afterwards, it had become the Kremlin's declared policy to oppose NATO's nuclear deterrent and to act in favour of its elimination.

"Security", so the Secretary General had said at the Party Congress, "could not be based forever on the fear of reprisals, that is to say, on the doctrines of 'deterrence' or 'intimidation'. Even without mentioning the absurdity and amorality of a situation in which the entire world is a nuclear hostage, these doctrines promote an armaments race that, sooner or later, is likely to get out of control".

Gorbachev had also branded Western reliance on a nuclear deterrent as a policy of "military violence". What had to be done, as he would have it, was to strive for the ideal of a "world without armaments and violence". For this reason there was need to engage in a political "struggle against the nuclear peril and the armaments race, and for the maintenance and consolidation of universal peace".⁷ Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had seconded the Secretary General with detailed remarks about the "world, free of nuclear weapons" that had to be created.⁸

Western experts are substantially inclined to regard the Soviet demand for the banning of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000 as idle propaganda that is not to be taken seriously. The invention of nuclear weapons could not be undone, as the Soviet leaders were well aware. Once the know-how existed, even the scrapping of nuclear weapons could be followed at any time by the creation of

new stocks by various parties—and this option would become all the more attractive the less the infringing party had to allow for highly developed nuclear capacities of other countries. What is more, to Western observers it seems more than doubtful that the Soviet leadership would really be prepared to forego the nuclear basis of the country's status as world power if the problem were ever to be posed in real terms.

These objections are undoubtedly right, but miss the nature of the problem that has to be faced here. Though the Kremlin does not regard the existence of nuclear weapons as generally harmful, it considers them so in connexion with the European theatre. Even under Brezhnev, Moscow already made a distinction between the two-way nuclear deterrence relationship between the USSR and the USA and the extension of this deterrence relationship to the European theatre. Deterrence between the world powers was—and still is—considered an untouchable fact that can even assume an expressly positive valence under the designation “strategic parity”. As far as the Kremlin is concerned, therefore, zero options in this field are out of the question and consideration is limited to reductions on a reciprocal basis as included in the agenda of the START negotiations.

The Soviet leadership has no difficulty in agreeing to the continued existence of bilateral strategic parity, because it has long since come to the conclusion that the US government is just as strongly interested in the non-use of this arsenal as the Soviet Union. At this level, therefore, there seems to be no menace of a nuclear war. But a great nuclear peril is seen in Europe. Since the Kremlin postulates the concrete possibility of a Western war initiative,⁹ the option of first use of non-strategic nuclear weapons that NATO maintains for the purpose of war prevention assumes the character of a serious military threat. The problem, then, is to counter this threat by depriving the Western Alliance of these non-strategic nuclear arms. The strategic weapon systems of the USA, on the other hand, are quite acceptable.

But the Soviet leaders take a different view of the nuclear situation in Europe, for reasons that are not difficult to understand. Indeed, the option of a war in Europe, which NATO considers undesirable, has been hitherto made unacceptable to the USSR, as well, by the capacity of the West of making first use of nuclear weapons.¹⁰ But this balanced relationship contradicts the Soviet postulate that “reliable defence” of the home country must be ensured



in the event of a war in the European theatre, which, if it is to be conceived at all—must therefore be kept conventional.

If all nuclear weapons were to be eliminated from the European countries west of the Soviet borders, the USSR would effectively no longer have to fear for its existence in the event of a war in the European theatre, which is postulated as a practical possibility.

One may expect nuclear escalation to have a special deterrent effect on the Soviet side even if one is prepared to accept the recently increasing assurances about the unacceptability of even a conventional war, because a nuclear clash would most probably lead to widespread destruction in the Soviet homeland and thus make it particularly clear to the leaders in Moscow that a trial of arms would defeat its own ends. The possibility of a conventional conflict would instead constitute a deadly menace only for the other countries of the continent.

Soviet anti-nuclearism finds expression not only in words. It also determines practical policy. Seen through the eyes of the Kremlin, the agreement about the elimination of all land-based missiles with a range from 500 to 5500 kilometres (the INF Treaty) concluded on December 8, 1987, constitutes a decisive step in the direction of the creation of a Europe without nuclear weapons. In addition, according to Moscow, the treaty triggered a development that, via other interim steps, will lead to the attainment of this goal.¹¹

One is struck by the fact that the Soviets do not attribute to their American treaty partners any merit whatsoever for the progress that has been made. The INF Treaty, so they say, is not due to the free consensus of the American government, but rather to the political effort made by the USSR, its allies and social mass movements in the West in opposing “militaristic activities in NATO’s European area”.

The Western side was trying to make good the defeat it had suffered by attempting in every possible way to reconstitute the treaty-reduced missile arsenals through “circumventions” and “compensations”. For this reason the struggle would have to be further intensified.¹² This line of argument is underlain by the tacit idea that the INF Treaty represents a blow to NATO’s security interests. The advantages gained by the treaty had now to be further enhanced by a fighting policy.

Ideals and realism

The Soviet leadership has specified its assessment in greater detail in statements intended exclusively for home consumption. Seen in a superficial manner, the Western side had made a good deal, for the USSR had to scrap a far larger number of missiles than the USA. But this aspect was not the decisive one. One rather had to see the "situation from the viewpoint of our fundamental military and political interests" and, accordingly, weigh the benefits not on the basis of quantity, but rather in the light of "the capacity of performing particular 'battle' tasks". One would then find that the INF Treaty had deprived the USA of the capacity of "creating an exceptionally unpleasant military threat for us at any time they so desired", while the USSR had not lost any military options with respect to North America or Western Europe as a result of scrapping these missiles. In this way the USSR had eliminated a factor that had unilaterally created complications for it in Europe and in relations with the other world power. Over and above this, the treaty served the Soviet interest to reduce the "military presence of the USA in the advanced sectors of the front in Europe and Asia". The treaty therefore appeared as a triumph of Gorbachev's new thinking, which in its essence did not represent any "nude and crude pragmatism", but rather a realistic orientation based on ideals and principles, i.e. an ideologically founded orientation paired with realism.¹³

As far as the Soviet leaders are concerned, the deterrent policy practiced by NATO in the European theatre represents the core of Western security policy. Accordingly, the alliance would become meaningless if NATO's nuclear deterrence would no longer cover the European members. In other words, without nuclear deterrence, it would become impossible to maintain the cohesion of the Western Alliance.

Gorbachev, in his political report to the 27th Congress of the CPSU, described East-West relations in terms of the class concepts of socialist-capitalist antagonism. Unfortunately, so he said, capitalism was still capable of "maintaining concrete economic, military, political and other positions" and "even had the possibility of social revenge, of winning back what it had previously lost".¹⁴ As Shevardnadze afterwards explained, "capitalism could not rid itself of the compulsive idea that the most advanced conquests of the human spirit, which are embodied in the means of annihilation, were appropriate for making its rule last forever and to bar the onward march of

history".¹⁵ This is underlain by the old idea that history has a purpose of its own that must necessarily lead from capitalism to socialism. The Western armed forces, and especially their nuclear components, are regarded as anti-historical instruments that have to be eliminated.

The Soviet concept is based on the realistic appreciation that the capacity of the West European countries for political self-assertion in the face of the USSR depends primarily on two factors, namely the alliance between Europe and the USA and its capacity to deny the Soviet side the unilateral option of waging war in Europe. If Western Europeans were no longer to receive a reliable guarantee for the prevention of war and therefore for their own security, they would find themselves face to face with an overpowering USSR, whose demands they could hardly resist. The evident belief of the Soviet leaders that under such circumstances they could extend their influence to Western Europe does not seem unfounded. If the Soviet proposal to build up "a comprehensive security system", above all in Europe, were to be accepted and implemented, inevitably developments in this direction would follow immediately after. The idea that NATO is a negative factor that has to be eliminated, at least in the long run, also underlies the criticism that began to be heard in 1988 of Stalin's mistaken Western policy. Following the Second World War, so it is said, the dictator's ruthless actions had unnecessarily divided the anti-Hitler coalition and had thus acquired NATO as a political mortgage that continues to be effective to this day.¹⁶

There are two ways in which the Soviet leadership is trying to convince the Western side of its good intentions. Firstly, it declares to accept the principle of "common" or "universal" security (*vseobscaja bezopasnost*). It is, however, difficult to estimate the practical value of this assurance, because the Kremlin, together with the extension of nuclear deterrence to Europe, rejects the Western concept of mutual security against war, but without developing any other concrete concept. Secondly, the Soviet side stresses that it seeks the creation of a situation in which neither side would be able to attack in the conventional domain. Here, once again, the decisive difficulty is constituted by the fact that the practical features of this theoretically postulated principle remain wholly unadumbrated.

Not only the Soviet experts, but also the proponents of this idea in the West, have hitherto been quite unable to show how the postulated "superiority of defence over attack" could be obtained. At the same time, Western military

leaders point out that the elimination of the nuclear risk sought by Moscow would automatically favour the attacking side in a hypothetical East-West war, because the aggressor could then concentrate his forces for a decisive breakthrough operation without having to fear a nuclear strike. But even more decisive than these details is the fact that, following acceptance of the principle of "non-offensive" defence, the conduct of military operations (albeit in a defensive sense) would take the place of war prevention as the central concern. But the security of the countries to the west of the Soviet Union can only be based on war prevention.

The domestic constraint

Western observers are generally inclined to dismiss the possibility of a desire for political expansion on the Soviet side, because the USSR, according to Gorbachev's own admissions, finds itself in a pre-crisis situation and would therefore hardly seem to have the strength for an aggressive policy towards the West. The Kremlin, so they say, has more urgent concerns at home than abroad. It is mistaken to see affirmations of offensive intentions as anything other than mere propaganda intended to demonstrate the ideological orthodoxy of the present leadership. But there is circumstantial evidence that speaks against this interpretation, and Soviet statements about the "political offensive" that is to be mounted against the Western countries is not by any means the most important feature in this respect.

One may wonder, for example, why Gorbachev and his collaborators do not hesitate to resort to anti-Western rhetoric, which seems rather strange in view of their call for collaboration with the West. The need for justifying themselves in domestic politics can hardly be used as explanation. The Soviet public today has little or no interest in ideologies of any kind. For the purposes of legitimising the regime in the eyes of the old party cadres it would be sufficient to stress that the policy goals that are being pursued continue to be of a socialist character. Only if the Soviet leaders have the intention of inducing a basically anti-Western orientation in their supporters at home would it seem meaningful to stick to the old categories of the "class struggle", the dichotomy of the two systems, and the ultimately socialist goal. In this case the problem would be to get the population and the cadres to feel that the present phase of détente must not serve to overcome the East-West contrast itself, and that cooperation with the West aims only at strengthening the socialist side in this historical conflict.

The internal weakness characteristic of the USSR today does, of course, reduce its possibilities of action abroad. The pursuit of anti-Western goals—as Lenin, Gorbachev's model, showed on an earlier occasion—must therefore be postponed until such time as, hopefully, the situation will have improved. It is a striking fact, however, that the Gorbachev leadership does not limit itself to terms and expressions suggesting postponement. It is also making great efforts to capitalise on the present weakness in resources as compared with the West, and to convert it into political-moral strength.

This is a theme clearly brought out by the criticism of the foreign and security policies of previous leaderships. As far as Stalin, Krushchev and Brezhnev are concerned, it is invariably objected that their political methods and/or their military armament suffered from a twofold defect. The resources of the USSR had been overtaxed, and at the same time the rest of the world had received the impression of a Soviet menace—with the consequence that the opposing forces became activated and coordinated. Consequently, the costly efforts to increase Soviet might by marshalling all reserves had in essential cases done more harm than good. Though Krushchev and, above all, Brezhnev had at first recognised the chance of softening the West through coexistence and *détente*, they had subsequently thrown away the successes that were beginning to show, by resorting to power demonstrations and modes of behaviour that conveyed the idea of a menace. The Soviet Union therefore had to make every effort to fight against this idea of a Soviet menace in the West and to put in its place a feeling of “confidence” in Soviet policy.¹⁷

If they succeed in toning down reserves and resistance in the West, the Soviet leaders think that it will prove easier to assert their concepts in world politics. This orientation makes it possible for them to present the renunciations of material means of power that are being made inevitable by the tense situation within the country as generous measures to stimulate confidence. More particularly, troop reductions—the steps announced by Gorbachev on December 7, 1988, being a case in point¹⁸—are being used to create the impression of a USSR that is fundamentally turning its back on military might. It is, however, quite remarkable to see the extent to which the present Soviet leadership is still maintaining military priorities in assigning resources, even though the country would urgently need these means for other purposes, so that only minor inevitable reductions of the military effort have so far been permitted.

Common human interest

The Gorbachev leadership has taken the idea that forces in the Western countries should be politically mobilised against the "class interest" of the West, and developed it into a consistent concept. In keeping with an increasing interdependence in international relations, "general human interests" are to have precedence over "class interests". This is in some way based on Lenin's interdependence idea. Accordingly, the "hostile classes"—which in the present international arena are represented by East and West—are locked in a bitter struggle against each other, but at the same time they are bound together by a common interest in avoiding the risk of mutual annihilation.

At this point an important part begins to be played by the Marxist-Leninist concept that history is bound to move away from capitalism and towards socialism. This leads to the conclusion that the future of the world can only be shaped by socialism. But if capitalism should succeed in becoming so strong as to stop the natural trend towards socialism, then this would bring destructive consequences in its wake, because capitalism, in the light of the thesis of its being historically condemned, is devoid of political and social force. The power of capitalism, so it is held, therefore rests solely on the availability of military instruments and, consequently, on nothing but the capacity to wreak destruction. In this way it could prevent the victory of socialism, but could not re-establish Western dominance in the world: the result could only be mutual annihilation. This perspective, which is traced back to prophetic remarks made by Lenin, seems to have assumed concrete shape with the nuclear weapons of the second half of the twentieth century.¹⁹

According to the Soviet thesis, the threatening catastrophe can be avoided only if East and West accord "general human interest" in common survival precedence over their class aspirations. This demand would seemingly imply that both sides put the common interest in the foreground. In actual fact, however, the socialist side is not by any means to abandon the struggle. It is only to be waged in a new way, namely with the watchword that the "general human interest" has to be preserved against the Western side, for example, by eliminating the nuclear basis of the Western deterrent policy.

This propagandistic employment of the "universally human" in the cause of the USSR is operated by the sleight of hand that in the East, class interest is equated with the interest of mankind, whereas in the West, they are said to be

in insurmountable conflict. The differential thesis, officially held in the USSR notwithstanding the ongoing discussion about the peace capacity of capitalism, is based on the premise that pursuit of capitalist self-preservation interest must necessarily lead to growing militarisation and ultimately to destruction of the world, while the gradual victory of socialism offers the hope of physical survival to all men, including the supporters of capitalism condemned to political doom. The defeat of capitalism sought by the socialist forces is therefore ultimately in the interest of the capitalists themselves, because history does not offer their endeavours of political self-assertion any chance of success other than total destruction of the world.²⁰

The concept of the priority of general human interest represents an essential basis of the official Soviet policy orientation. The political offensive against NATO is pushed ahead with appeals to the presumed self-interest of the people in the West. Whereas in the Brezhnev period only “peace forces” and other “progressive circles” in Western society were seen as potential allies of Soviet policy against the intrigues of the Western Alliance, the appeal is now addressed to everybody in the West, from habitual contestors right through to conservative and state-founding groups and even those responsible for government: what is held up to their eyes is their interest in the survival of mankind, in their own continued existence, an interest that—so it is made out—obliges them to support the Soviet point of view. What are left unsaid, of course, are the reminders—used only for domestic consumption—that what is at stake is merely the satisfaction of the Western interest in physical self-preservation, for the sake of which no account must be taken of the Western interest in political self-assertion. The practical result is the propagandist appeal to the West to defend, together with the USSR and against short-sighted representatives of “imperialism”, the common values of all mankind, values that rational human beings cannot but accept without reserve. This, above all, is the banner of Gorbachev’s “popular diplomacy”, which seeks to mobilise the Western public against these “imperialists”.

What has just been outlined represents the official concept, the guideline underlying present-day Soviet policy. The analysis made here does not fail to realise that the frequent use of “interdependence” and “all-mankind” slogans, of which the ultimate meaning—in reality contrary to the apparent one—is often opportunely left unspoken, is associated with a potentially softening effect in the long run. Since the key concepts lend themselves rather obviously to an interpretation other than the one officially attributed to them, the passage



of time could increasingly give rise to ambivalence and shifts of meaning. In the Soviet discussion that has got under way under the banner of *glasnost*, indeed, private people are already using many of the relevant terms differently from official intentions. But when one takes a look at official foreign and security policy, one must not underestimate the capacity of the official *apparat* to stick to the concepts as ordered from above.

Germany in Soviet policy

Germany played a key part in the considerations of the Kremlin long before Soviet power came to extend into Central Europe in 1944-1945. Lenin was already convinced that the much-desired world revolution would get under way and prove victorious as soon as as the German proletariat took its side. Following the Second World War, again, Stalin saw the domination of Germany as the key for extending his power into Western Europe. Especially after the outbreak of the Cold War in 1947, he sought to gain the sympathy and support of the German population on both sides of the border for his policy. For the next five years, albeit with some brief interruptions, he unleashed a campaign in favour of German national unity in which the Western powers were attacked and described as “splitters” of the German state. When he caused the GDR to be proclaimed in October 1949, he did so in the expectation that it would become “the cornerstone of a united and peace-loving Germany” associated with the USSR and thus trigger a turn in European history favourable to the Soviet Union.

The hope harboured by Soviet leaders that within a reasonably short period of time they would be able to extend their influence from the GDR to the whole of Germany was shaken by the East German revolt of June 17, 1953. Thereafter the Kremlin sought ways and means other than re-unification slogans for exerting some influence over West Germany, relying particularly on the idea of “European security”, and these efforts became further intensified after the Federal Republic was accepted as a member of NATO in 1955. Diplomatic relations with Bonn, which were established in September 1955, were to create the necessary conditions. Krushchev at first sought to make progress towards his goal of loosening the bonds between the Federal Republic and NATO, by adopting an emphatically friendly and conciliatory approach in his dealings with West Germany. When this bore no fruit, he decided to use pressure. The ultimatum of November 30, 1958, which triggered a Berlin crisis that was to last four years, was intended, among other things, to remind the

West German government of its dependence on Soviet good will and, at the same time, to punish Bonn for its stubbornness in the event that it wanted to ignore this message. But the Soviet leader overestimated his possibilities. He sought to exert pressure on the West by exploiting the widely held view of a presumed American "missile gap", but—notwithstanding some partial successes—the bluff failed, and his political offensive ground to a standstill.

Soviet endeavours entered a new phase when General de Gaulle, in 1966, announced that France would leave NATO's military organisation. As far as Moscow was concerned, this step further enhanced the importance of the Federal Republic. Henceforth Moscow had no doubt whatsoever that NATO could exist only for as long as West Germany maintained its membership. If Germany could be persuaded to leave the Atlantic Alliance or, at least, to abandon its military organisation, there would be no further basis for the stationing of American troops in Europe or the concertation of a common defence. No country on the European continent would thereafter be able to rely on NATO protection.²² The view that the Atlantic Alliance would stand and fall with West Germany has remained an unshakeable axiom of Soviet policy towards the West ever since.²³

In the 1960s, just as it had done a decade earlier, the Kremlin sought to attain its purposes by using both carrot and stick, which were represented, respectively, by the slogans of "European security" and "West German *revanchism*". Whenever the Federal Republic seemed ready to meet important Soviet demands, Moscow would drop the *revanchism* reproaches and avow a policy in accord with the requirements of "European security". But whenever Bonn was clearly on the NATO line, as was usually the case, accusations began to be levelled against West Germany and every conceivable pressure was brought to bear by Moscow.²⁴

A new situation arose with the East-West détente of the 1970s. Owing to the *modus vivendi* reached in Central Europe in 1970-1972, the Soviet leadership substantially renounced using accusations of *revanchism* as a means of exerting pressure. But it gained new political levers in view of the hopes aroused in Bonn. West Berlin, for example, was to become "more secure" as a result of the new arrangements. The treaties with the GDR were in essential respects aimed at ushering in better contacts and communications across the inner-German border. Despite their basic readiness to grant "human facilitations", neither the Soviets nor their East German allies were really willing to

automatically meet West German expectations in the application of the treaties that had been concluded. The Soviet leadership made it clear, time and time again, that it regarded the granting or refusal of concessions that went beyond an absolute and restrictively interpreted minimum of treaty obligations as an instrument with which—either directly or in collaboration with the GDR—it could reward or punish Bonn.

During the controversy about the stationing of the INF missiles the USSR kept trying, with the support of its East German allies, to use the West German interest in West Berlin and inner-German contacts for the purpose of mobilising very broad circles in the Federal Republic against NATO policy. “Warnings” were being formulated about a new “ice age” in East-West relations and its possible consequences for Germany’s position. But when the Federal Republic, despite these menaces, set about to carry out the NATO decisions, it was found that the Soviets—and for good reason—hesitated to translate their words into deeds. The effectiveness of peace appeals to the general public in the Federal Republic and other Western countries depended, in a decisive fashion, on the USSR being seen as a power full of good will towards the rest of the world. Had Moscow made the threatened consequences come true, it would inevitably have created the image of a Soviet Union that used fear and terror to achieve its purposes.

New thinking and old warnings

The Gorbachev leadership learned the lessons of past experiences, so that the supreme commandment became that of associating the USSR exclusively with positive concepts. The rest of the world was no longer to associate such negative acts as refusals or threats with Soviet policy, the intention being to avoid disturbing the process of confidence building that was needed to create the necessary receptivity for Soviet concepts. As far as possible, therefore, the goals of Soviet policy were to be attained by meeting the desires and needs of Western interlocutors. This guiding principle limited the possibility of influencing other countries by means of “warnings”. Ever since, the accent has therefore been placed on using positive stimuli to induce governments and societies outside the Soviet power sphere to identify themselves with Moscow’s point of view.

Shevardnadze elevated this “new thinking” into an obligatory norm governing the conduct of Soviet diplomats. But when the Soviet foreign minister visited

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Bonn in May 1989 and sought to induce the Federal Republic to unconditionally refuse the proposed modernisation of land-based short-range missiles, he himself violated this principle, and badly so, as he tried to attain his ends by conjuring up prospects that had the ring of threats.

Deeming—incorrectly—that the NATO proposals aimed at the creation of a missile corresponding to the Soviet “Oka” (SS-23), which is to be scrapped under the INF Treaty, he said that this “most important international agreement” was in danger and asked the following question: “Why should we scrap the SS-23 missiles if the other side builds analogous “Lance 2” missiles and plans to deploy them? The problem cannot be solved by means of scholastic exercises. The fact of the matter is that there will be two equivalent missiles. But the Soviet missiles will be scrapped, while the American ones will be produced”. He added that “common sense could not accept this, to say nothing of political reason”.

When asked by a journalist whether this meant that the USSR would stop the agreed scrapping of the SS-23 missiles if NATO modernised its short-range missiles, he replied that this would have to be “considered”. “Would it make sense to scrap these missiles? Or should we in that case create new systems and thereby react to the NATO decision?” On being asked whether he was really speaking of “new systems”, he replied with a clear: “We shall either have to stop scrapping the SS-23 missiles or create new systems”. But, as he added, that would not be “our choice”.²⁵

When the West German press took the view that Shevardnadze had threatened the annulment of treaty obligations, he reacted with the statement that “nobody in the Soviet Union” had “the intention of violating the INF Treaty”. But this was followed by a reiteration of the Soviet viewpoint that seemed to cancel this assurance. “We shall not stand by idly while the United States and other zealous proponents of the replacement of the Lance missiles undermine this important document, which has played a key role in the improvement of the international climate, and is continuing to do so”. The Soviet Union, as he went on, did not thereby make threats, for it “threatened” nothing other than this spectre²⁶ of the INF Treaty being called into question.

West German observers were struck by the parallelism between the remarks made by Shevardnadze in Bonn and the “warnings” that his predecessor Gromyko had uttered in the West German capital nine and a half years earlier.

Both theme and situation had been altogether similar: the problem likewise concerned NATO's nuclear missiles and the West German attitude to them, and Gromyko, just like Shevardnadze, had prospected negative consequences in the event of the Federal Republic accepting these missiles at the forthcoming NATO meeting. In December 1979, the threat had taken the form of a refusal to negotiate missile reductions, a threat that was subsequently translated into practice.

In May 1988, with a NATO summit just ahead, the West Germans were made to glimpse the possibility that the Soviet Union might refuse to abide by its obligation to scrap the SS-23 missile. But this would have been an unprecedented step and, even if NATO had decided in favour of immediate modernisation, one could hardly imagine that the Gorbachev leadership would really have taken such a decision. It would have called into question not only all existing international law, but also the very process of nuclear disarmament in the European theatre that the Kremlin has been pushing ahead with such zeal.

A nuclear-free Europe?

Shevardnadze's remarks with their threatening ring are evidently based on the view that, given the anti-nuclear attitude predominating in the Federal Republic, German public opinion would react with great concern to glimpsing the possibility of a hitch in nuclear disarmament. The Soviet foreign minister was also relying on the lack of familiarity of the wider public with the practical details of the matter, for the real situation was very different from what it had been represented to be.

The obligations deriving from the INF Treaty relate to land-based missiles with a range of more than 500 kilometres, while the modernised version of the Lance missile proposed by NATO is intended to cover a clearly shorter range. Under no circumstances, therefore, could the USSR claim some factual relationship between its SS-23 missiles to be scrapped under the INF Treaty and the Lance missiles. Moscow's assurance that, unlike the West, the Soviets do not intend to introduce new short-range missiles likewise tends to hide the real facts. The Soviet missile potential in this category, stationed in Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia, has been undergoing modernisation ever since 1987, so that the decision to introduce a new weapon generation, which is currently being debated within NATO, has already been taken by the Warsaw Pact.

All told, therefore, one finds that the twelve to one superiority of the Soviets in the short-range missile field has in recent years become systematically supplemented by a qualitative superiority. If NATO could be induced to forego its modernisation proposals, this would even lead to a situation of monopoly as soon as the old Lance systems become obsolete from the mid-1990s onwards. As far as one can see at the moment, the Kremlin would be prepared to give up its present double advantage if it were to be compensated for this not only with a denuclearisation by means of a "third zero option", but also by Western concessions in the negotiations over conventional forces in Europe (CSCE), especially an overproportional reduction of NATO air forces with their greater range. The desired prevention of Western modernisation evidently serves the purpose of preventing an equalisation of the present, extremely asymmetrical nuclear potential in the European theatre and thus maintaining a negotiating counter for the more far-reaching goal of future CSCE arms negotiations.

Soviet policy thus aims at maximising its advantage in the short-range missile field and is based on military-strength considerations. The stronger the USSR can be made as compared to NATO, the more readily can the desired "third zero option" in the short-range field be made to seem advantageous and necessary in Western eyes. The general public in the Western countries would then press even more strongly in favour of not missing such a "good deal". This suggests that one may expect hesitant governments to come under increasing domestic pressure. Likewise, Western governments themselves may increasingly wonder to what extent their dwindling nuclear weapon capacities still constitute a basis for realising the NATO security concept, namely deterring the USSR from war by maintaining a credible escalation risk in Europe and preventing the concentration of the forces of the Eastern bloc, which would optimise their offensive potential but also offer ready-made targets for nuclear strikes. It is only natural that such considerations should be made, above all, in the Federal Republic, because it would bear the brunt of a hypothetical use of the all-powerful Soviet missiles and, unlike the three major Western powers, possesses no nuclear arsenal of its own.

The art of compromising


As seen by the Kremlin, the two "zero options" of the INF Treaty for medium and long-range land-based missiles were a decisive but still insufficient step on the way to eliminating the nuclear deterrent. This regulation of the matter ensured that NATO would lose its most effective means of retaliating in the

event of war in the European theatre and, by this threat of destruction in the Soviet homeland, of convincing the USSR of the absolute unacceptability of a military conflict in Europe. Furthermore, since the renunciation involved only the missile carriers, the West was deprived of a possible instrument for realising the FOFA (Follow on Forces Attack) concept against attacking concentrations moving up in the rear of an Eastern aggressor.²⁷

The elimination of the land-based short-range missiles at present desired by the Soviets would deprive NATO of its remaining nuclear-capacity missiles in the European theatre. For the purposes of nuclear deterrence of the USSR and military interdiction in the hinterland of the Warsaw Pact, therefore, the North Atlantic Alliance would have to depend exclusively on the less reliable and efficient instruments of its long-range aircraft, which are also under political attack by the Soviets, and submarine-based missiles, which are being called into question as part of the START negotiations. Presumably the Soviet leadership deems not only that these challenges can be parried more readily, but also expects that they can be negotiated out of existence at a subsequent stage, so that NATO's nuclear deterrent would thereafter be deprived of its real basis once and for all.

Doubts are occasionally expressed in the West as to whether Gorbachev and his collaborators are really interested in denuclearisation. In this connexion, attention is usually drawn to the Soviet readiness as voiced often and in various contexts, to accept partial solutions for as long as the Western side is not prepared to go further. Although such Soviet statements seem to be meant quite seriously, they do not mean that the Soviet leadership would abandon its further-reaching concepts if a partial arrangement were to be achieved. Rather, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze have learned from the failures of the Brezhnev era that one has to practice the art of compromise. One must avoid an all-or-nothing attitude, which would probably mean obtaining nothing at all.

One simply had to use all the possibilities that offered themselves from time to time, though without losing sight of further-reaching future perspectives. For example, the shelving of the demand that the USA should abandon their Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) made it possible for the Kremlin to attain its goals associated with the INF Treaty, though the abandonment of this imperative does not mean that the anti-SDI goal has been abandoned forever.



Realisation of the Soviet concept for the denuclearisation of the European countries to the west of the USSR would confer a non-nuclear status upon the Western forces in the face of an opponent who would still be able to rely on a nuclear component in the Soviet hinterland. This would have far-reaching effects on security policy. In the USA, indeed, one can already note concern that the troops sent to Europe could find themselves unilaterally without the protection of nuclear weapons and therefore in a position of inferiority in the event of war with the Soviet Union.

If the Kremlin were to succeed in imposing such an asymmetry in the European theatre, the American presence in Europe would be called into question, because the USA would hardly accept such an unequal relationship. If European countries, especially the Federal Republic, were to prove ready to support tendencies in this direction, they would offer the USSR a point of leverage for dividing the NATO members. The tensions that came to the fore between West Germany and the Anglo-Saxon countries just before the NATO Summit of May 1989 give a foretaste of the centrifugal forces that could develop in such conditions.

The FGR and denuclearisation

It is the Soviet view that, following the scrapping of the missiles affected by the INF Treaty, the core of the USA nuclear deterrent extended to Europe will be represented by NATO's land-based short-range missiles. Since the greater part of these missiles are stationed in the Federal Republic, the West German attitude cannot but be of decisive importance. The proposed modernisation can be carried out only with the full agreement of the Federal Republic. Soviet efforts are therefore directed primarily to mobilising the West Germans against the NATO proposals. Since Bonn has opted for early East-West negotiations regarding this matter, the Kremlin is now concerned with starting negotiations at once, undermining acceptance of the NATO proposals by initiatives during these negotiations that will leave their mark on the public and bringing the West Germans round to the principle of the zero option, i.e. complete elimination of these missiles.

This political strategy also avails itself of factors other than the attraction effects of slogans that promise security. Gorbachev and his collaborators make quite conscious use of the political and moral credit that their domestic reform policies have gained for them among West Germans. The readiness of the GDR

regime to permit their citizens to make far more frequent visits to relatives on the other side of the inner-German frontier, a readiness largely due to internal factors, is also causing West Germans to place great hopes in a change for the better in East-West relations and is thus furthering Soviet propaganda aims of "confidence."

Gorbachev's aim of influencing the West Germans is also greatly facilitated by the political-psychological basis created by the INF Treaty. During the missile-stationing controversy of 1979-1983, the Western Alliance could still base itself on a clear guideline regarding security policy vis-à-vis the USSR, albeit with the problem that this guideline was familiar to the experts but not the general public. But there was, in any case, a rational basis that could serve as an orientating yardstick. Accordingly, NATO's proposals had the function of proving a nuclear deterrent against war in Europe. Missiles of various ranges had a well defined place in this concept.

However, the Western side itself called into question this basis for argumentation when President Reagan opted for SDI as a relief-bringing alternative to the so-called "immoral" nuclear deterrent and later agreed to Soviet proposals involving two zero options for land-based missiles with ranges of 500-1000 and 1000-5500 kilometres, respectively.

Once the principle of nuclear deterrence had practically been abandoned, the INF Treaty was widely seen among the Western public as confirmation of the popular view that nuclear missiles were the "work of the devil" and had to be done away with as quickly as possible. Sight was thus lost of the fact that NATO employs these missiles as a political means of preventing war in Europe. The logic of the nuclear deterrent was abandoned; in official Western rhetoric, missiles now appeared as a weapon whose substantial elimination would serve the ends of peace. The fact that it had proved possible to eliminate two categories of missiles appeared as a triumph of reason.

Under these circumstances it was only logical to think that further zero options would continue the positive development that had just got off the mark. And official Western spokesmen, bound as they were by their previous explanations, could not explain why this logic all of a sudden was not applicable as far as the modernisation of NATO's short-range missiles was concerned. The reasons with which they had justified the INF Treaty also speak against the maintenance of short-range missiles.

But there is yet more to it: these missiles have a range that distinguishes them disadvantageously from the missiles that have to be scrapped under the INF Treaty. They cannot make the Soviet enemy fear retaliation in its own territory and thus deter it from war. The destruction they would cause in the event of war would be limited *a priori* to Central Europe—and this means substantially to areas inhabited by Germans. It is not surprising that this circumstance should render short-range missiles particularly suspect as far as Germans are concerned. The Soviet propaganda *apparat* availed itself of this problem and presented short-range missiles as a weapon system directed specifically against Germans.

The West German government therefore found itself in a very difficult position when it tried to explain NATO policy and get it accepted in Germany. The spectre of a nuclear war limited to the two German states reared its head among the German public. This atmosphere has contributed to a situation in which the election of 1990 seems to spell acute danger for the government coalition, whose majority appears far from certain. The longer view, moreover, adumbrates a structural change of the party system in the Federal Republic: taking its origin from the anti-Schmidt upheaval in the SPD and the political consolidation of the Greens, it has led to a sharp leftward turn in security matters.²⁸

The Kohl-Genscher government has therefore felt obliged to take account of the situation on the home front and to fall partly in line with the prevailing trends. From the viewpoint of the Western Alliance, this change of course may serve to forestall an even more radical move away from NATO policy that would result should the conservative-liberal coalition succumb to the SPD opposition. The Kremlin, instead, obviously saw this development as further encouragement for the attempt to force the government by means of domestic political pressure to keep swimming with the anti-nuclear stream.

The Kremlin and Germany's problems

Despite his strong interest in getting West Germany to move away from NATO policy, Gorbachev did not feel obliged to make his wooing more effective by meeting some of Bonn's desires. When preparing the visit of the Secretary General, Shevardnadze had already refused a request for a permanent agreement regarding the treatment of West Berlin. A conciliatory attitude with regard to West German desires could be observed only in the course of

rhetorical exercises in a noncommittal context. While Soviet speakers right through to 1986-1987 had always carefully avoided any reference to the problem of German unity, some siren-like tones did occasionally make themselves heard thereafter. Gorbachev himself fell in line with this trend when he departed from his previous official thesis that the national question in Germany had been irrevocably decided in the sense of partition and spoke of the German question as a problem that some day would be judged by history. He thus left some room for West German speculation that the Kremlin might possibly agree to a unification of the country.

Several Soviet representatives went even further and, albeit in very vague form, outlined the possibility of progress in overcoming the division. In this connexion there was also talk about pulling down the wall in Berlin. As a general rule, however, these remarks were made by members of the Soviet *apparat* for propaganda abroad. And they were regularly followed by denials from the Foreign Ministry, responsible for actual policy. The verbal exercises were evidently intended to remind the West Germans that any solution of their national question depends on the USSR. At the same time, bearing in mind that the joint declaration had spoken of the need for working towards a breakdown of the European bloc structure in the long term, these remarks were designed to arouse hopes in the West German public that were hardly likely to be fulfilled. In real politics Moscow remained just as strongly anchored to German partition as before.

At his press conference on June 15, 1989, in Bonn, the Secretary General himself had to face questions about "the wall". He replied that the wall "had come into being in a concrete situation". It could disappear again when these "conditions" no longer existed. He did not see this as a "particularly big problem". The basic view, that the wall served a political purpose and was not there for its own sake, had always been the official Soviet attitude. Only the express reference that pulling down the wall would no longer be a problem once changed conditions had become established, whenever this might be, was new in this particular form, even though it had always been within the logic of the subject matter. Gorbachev expressed himself in similarly noncommittal form when he was asked how he assessed the chances of the two German states becoming unified in a future European community. The present situation, so he said, had come into being in a particular period—that was the way of realities. But in the meantime *détente* and collaboration had strayed from the mark, and he therefore hoped "that time would do the rest".

A political challenge

Soviet policy regarding the Federal Republic has always been motivated by the endeavour to weaken the country's commitment to NATO and thus to render the long-term existence of the Western Alliance doubtful. Strong interest in material contributions by West Germany to the restructuring of the Soviet system, to putting the economy on its feet again and increasing its technological level has not squashed out this primary anti-NATO concern. It always depends on the circumstances whether and to what extent one or the other of these two component predominates. Seen from outside, they stand unconnected, side by side. This impression is caused by the fact that the Soviet leadership, given its pressing economic and technical needs, is pursuing a policy of cooperation with Bonn, which it does not want to see disturbed by its contemporaneous anti-NATO concern and which it therefore seeks to keep away from the limelight of bilateral relations.

The net result is what seems to be an almost schizophrenic game played at several levels. Just as in the case of other Western countries, Gorbachev and his collaborators show themselves to be cooperative and conciliatory towards the Federal Republic whenever visits are exchanged and talks are being tabled. On these occasions, they stress the things in common while the things that divide are veiled or ignored.

The Soviet endeavour to undermine the policy of the Atlantic Alliance becomes clear only when one looks at all the various actions of the USSR in the field of foreign and security policy and analyses them in the light of the explanations given to their own cadres and followers. One can then see that Gorbachev's policy, even more markedly than that of his predecessors, represents a challenge to NATO. However, one will not understand this challenge if one tries to grasp it in terms of the traditional Western categories of a military threat. Even more clearly than in earlier days, we are here concerned with a political challenge in which troops and weapons play the subordinate part of mere instruments.

In this political challenge, Gorbachev is capitalising even on Soviet shortcomings. Given the domestic weakness of the Soviets, the present Secretary General is concentrating his attention in a very special manner on the very points where he is beginning to run short of military resources, trying to create the impression of a freely chosen abandonment of military means, this

with a view to obtain political concessions from in the West and, at the same time, to create Western readiness for reciprocity in disarmament. Ideally, the Kremlin would thus gain general sympathy without loss of relative military power.

Just how little the Gorbachev leadership is prepared to forego existing advantages—if it can in some way avoid it—is shown particularly clearly by its policy towards the Federal Republic. Moscow considers the West Germans as the decisive factor on which the success of NATO's policy depends. Nevertheless, those responsible for Soviet foreign policy show little readiness to make concessions to Bonn even in such subordinate matters as the Berlin clause in the inter-allied agreements. Rather, they put their money on exploiting the “contradictions” in the policy of the Western countries and the domestic political constellation of the Federal Republic. The Soviets seem to be ready to make compromises only when—as in the case of the INF Treaty—the sacrifice of secondary interests ensures the assertion of a priority Soviet interest in a concrete and reliable manner.

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- 1 - Cf. “Takicheskoe iadernoe oruzhie : prevoskhodstvo ili ravenstvo?” <Akhromeev interview>, *Pravda*, April 19, 1989.
- 2 - E. Grigor'ev, “Shest' chasov rechei i sporov”, *Pravda*, April 28, 1989.
- 3 - Text of the NATO communiqué ref: May 30, 1989 in : United States Policy Information and Texts, no. 69, May 31, 1989, S. 9-16
- 4 - Text : *Pravda*, June 13, 1989.
- 5 - Ebenda.
- 6 - For the 1979-83 experience see the author's detailed analysis in : Gerhard Wettig, *High Road, Low Road. Diplomacy and Public Action in Soviet Foreign Policy*. Washington D.C. : Pergamon-Brassey's 1989, pp.
- 7 - *Pravda*, February 26, 1986.
- 8 - *Pravda*, March 2, 1986.
- 9 - In private, Gorbachev has expressed the opinion that he feels that the West will not wage war (see his remarks made to Soviet writers on June 19, 1986, as subsequently revealed by, inter alia , *L'Unità*, October 7, 1986, and *La Repubblica* , October 7, 1986.)
- 10 - It can be demonstrated that the Soviet leaders see the problem precisely in this way.

- 11 - See the official explanations of the Treaty given to both the foreign relations commissions of the Supreme Soviet (*Pravda*, February 10, 1988) and to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (*Pravda*, May 29, 1988) in the course of the ratification procedure.
- 12 - Speech by Gorbachev on February 18, 1988, *Pravda*, February 19, 1988.
- 13 - "Pervyi real'nyi rezul'tat perestroiki," *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, February, 1988, pp. 4-5, 3. The English version of the article ("A Real Step Towards a Safe World," *International Affairs*, February 1988, pp. 3-12) does not contain the relevant passages.
- 14 - *Pravda*, February 26, 1986.
- 15 - *Pravda*, March 2, 1986.
- 16 - The topic was unofficially introduced into public discussion by Viacheslav Dashichev, "Vostok - zapad poisk novykh otnoshenii : O prioritetaх vneshnei politiki sovetskogo gosudarstva," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, May 18, 1988. The article dates back to a policy proposal submitted by Dashichev in the early 1980's, which was taken only by the Gorbachev leadership. It is reflected in the Central Committee theses for the XIXth CPSU Conference in mid-1988 and in a large number of subsequent official and semi-official statements.
- 17 - See, eg. the programmatic speech given by E.A. Shevardnadze at the Scientific-practical Conference of the Soviet Foreign Ministry on July, 25 1988, *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* 9/1988, pp. 13, 29-30, 37.
- 18 - *Pravda*, December, 8 1988
- 19 - V.I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 5th ed., Moscow: Gospolitizdat vol. 26 (1961), pp. 55, 59, vol. 36 (1962), pp. 396-397; N. Krupskaja, *O Lenine*, Moscow: Izd. pol. Lit. 1960, pp. 40-41; "Dialektika novogo myshleniia" <interpretation of Gorbachev's book "Perestroika">, *Kommunist*, 18/1987, pp. 4-7; E.A. Shevardnadze, "Na puti k bezopasnomu miru", *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, 8/1988, pp.19-24.
- 20 - See, inter alia, V.V. Zagladin, "Programmnye tseli KPSS i global'nye problemy" <official explanations of the draft for the PCSU Party Program>, *Kommunist*, 2/1986, pp.3-7; speech by E.A. Shevardnadze to foreign policy cadres on May-3, 1987, *Vestnik ministerstva inostrannykh del*, no.1 (August 5, 1987), pp.18-19; V.Zagladin, "Put' ternisty, no neobkhodimy", *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, 8/1988, pp.19-24.
- 21 - Congratulatory telegram of Stalin to the leaders of the GDR, October 13, 1949, *Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik der Sowjetunion*, vol.1, Berlin (East): Ruetten & Loening 1957, pp.238-239.
- 22 - See "Opasnye tendentsii", *Novoe vremia*, 6/1967, p.4; "V interesakh prochnogo mira", *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* 6/1967, pp.5-6.
- 23 - For an authoritative statement to this effect at the height of the missile controversy see V. Shaposhnikov, "O nekotorykh problemakh sovremennoogo antivoennogo dvizheniia", *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, 12/1981, p.23.
- 24 - An instructive example of this pattern is provided by the two successive changes in Soviet attitude towards the "Big Coalition" government formed in December 1966 (see Gerhard Wettig, "Moskau un die Grosse Koalition in Bonn", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Beilage zur Wochenzeitung 'Das Parlament'*, B 10/68, March 6, 1968, pp.3-22).

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25 - Transcript of Shevardnadze's press conference in Bonn on May 13, 1989 as carried by TASS in Russia on the same day and also by *Pravda*, May 14, 1989.

26 - "Otvety E.A. Shevardnadze na voprosy korrespondenta gazety 'Pravda'", *Pravda* May 20, 1989.

27 - A strategic concept according to which, in case of an attack by the Warsaw Pact, the NATO forces would try to hit the second and third lines of the second and third lines of the enemy, with conventional or, if necessary, nuclear weapons, but without a massive use of troops behind enemy lines.

28 - Werner Kaltefleiter, "Die Erosion der Sicherheitspolitik und der Wettbewerb im Parteiensystem", *Europäische Wehrkunde*, 4/1989, pp.223-231.