



MOVING TARGETS

Britain in Today's World

A Conversation with Michael Heseltine

E Starting from the well known theory of the three superimposing circles of British presence in the world—the trans-Atlantic circle, the Commonwealth circle and the European circle—you have written something that sounds somewhat surprising to a continental observer. You have written that, over the past forty years, Britain has been losing relevance in each of these three spheres. This is hardly disputable as far as the Commonwealth is concerned, but not everybody agrees that the role of the UK has declined in the Euro-American sphere, that the special relationship with the US has been fading away. On the contrary, the present British prime minister seems to attach a great deal of importance to it. And this in spite of the fact that the US has developed in the postwar years some very special strategic relationships with other countries such as Germany and Israel, and also in spite of the fact that in American domestic politics, there has been an increase in the weight of some groups, such as the Irish-Americans or the Greek-Americans and even the Armenian-Americans, that have had a far bigger impact on Washington's diplomacy than any pro-British group. Take Ireland, for example. There certainly is an Irish lobby in the United States, and sometimes a very noisy one. But there is no British lobby.

Michael Heseltine - Well, you've mentioned two other special relationships. Indeed, quite obviously, in the context of the forty years that I am talking about, the recoveries of the strength by Germany and France have in their own ways created relationships for those two countries and the United States for which there was no obvious counterpart at the end of the Second World War, where Britain had played a unique role in providing for the liberation of Europe. So there is no doubt that there has been an evolving relationship between the United States of America and those two countries. In Europe,

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it was inevitable; it was bound to happen. The scale of the American military commitment to the Federal Republic would reinforce the growing position of the German economy.

This, however, does not mean to say that our relationship with America has disappeared, or has turned sour, or anything of that sort. It is simply that American foreign policy relationships are bound to draw an arrangement of commitments in different parts of the world which, depending upon the instance of the moment or the political pressures of the time, serve her policy objectives. I do not think it is anything to be surprised about.

E *As far as the third sphere—Europe—is concerned, there is no doubt that British relevance has declined in the 1960's. But, after joining the Common Market, Britain is more important to Europe than it has ever been—although in a different way.*

Michael Heseltine - I agree with your second sentence. I would myself believe that Britain has more to gain and more to contribute in seeking to mold the European evolution than in abstaining. The most obvious subject at the moment where this relates is the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System of which we are not full members. I would have hoped that Britain would have joined in order to demonstrate clearly our commitment to the anti-inflationary policies associated with the EMS. I see this as a part of the discussion that has unfolded about European monetary union in which we will play a leading role. The United Kingdom will play a more influential role in the EMS if she is a committed member from the first stage than if she stays outside it.

E *Another point on this: is the evolution of the British economy making European involvement more interesting or less interesting for British business? You have criticised the characteristics of the recent British growth model, by pointing out that the tertiary sector in Britain is becoming disproportionately large, while the manufacturing sector is given more importance in the other Common Market countries. This relative disinterest of the British authorities for the predicament of the national manufacturing sector to outside observers seems to be related to episodes such as the agreements with the Japanese car industry. Of course, it could be said that we on the continent are obsessed with the idea of Japanese manufacturers being able to be treated in the European Market on more or less equal footing with local*

producers. But it is a fact that the laissez faire, laissez passer attitude of the British Government plus the weakness and lack of competitiveness of some European firms, especially the car sector, is in a way making Britain the soft underbelly of the Common Market. Hasn't Britain become a kind of entrance gate to the Common Market for foreign investment? And it is not only in the manufacturing sector that the other EEC countries try to protect against the real fortress, as you refer to Japan, but also in tertiary activities such as banking.

Michael Heseltine - I think that in your question there are a number of issues. I have no doubt that the protectionist practices of the Japanese are of varied concern to the Americans, to the Europeans and to the British as part of the EC, and I have no doubt that the pressures on the Japanese to change their practices will grow in strength as people's anxieties about it develop. That is what is actually happening, and understandably so. What we want ideally is to persuade the Japanese to change because they recognise the case for a more open approach to free trade, rather than have to confront them with more retaliatory attitudes such as you see growing in America and, indeed, in Europe.

On this side of the Atlantic, many people tend to take much the same view. But it would be much better to negotiate changes in the Japanese practices rather than try to confront the Japanese with all the damage that might flow from such a situation. Of course, if the Japanese do not respond to our efforts of persuasion, the case for a tougher approach will become harder to resist, but you will not be able to make such a case from the standpoint of a relatively small national economy. Now you can argue that the more interwoven Japanese interests are with Europe, Britain in this case—Britain in Europe—the more persuasive our case will be when we say that there have to be changes in Japanese practices. Who will the Japanese listen to more? The British where they have a considerable investment interest, or the Europeans where they do not? The answer is that Britain and Europe will speak with the same voice: my judgement as our economy becomes inter-related.

E *You think therefore that the more interwoven the British and Japanese economies are, the better Europe's negotiating position will be?*

Michael Heseltine - Yes, I think so. The Japanese will perceive the self-interest in the investment they have in Europe and will be therefore more likely

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to listen to and negotiate with people they see as partners as opposed to people they see as antagonists. One cannot avoid the competition that Japan represents. The worst way to try to avoid it would be to erect a protectionist ring around Europe of the sort that they have around Japan. Somehow, we have got to persuade the Japanese to change their approach, rather than imitate them. It will not be easy to do it and it will not be by as simplistic as a confrontational approach. A third approach to trade practices will obviously be needed, but I think it will more asily be the result of persuasion, that it will come from one partner arguing with another.

There is a third way between being a fortress and being a sieve. Life is not about blacks and whites. Often a relationship of cooperation is more constructive than one of confrontation.

E *A cooperative attitude, however, should not mean giving up the cards*
I *that one might have in case of confrontation. In other words, Europe should sit at the negotiating table still with the possibility of an alternative course, if an agreement is not found. We should not sit at a negotiating table in such a condition that we are bound to find an agreement. We should keep a certain number of options open.*

Michael Heseltine - Well, you are bound to approach the negotiating table in a manner that does not imply threats, because that immediately raises the tension. Equally, if you do approach it in a friendly and constructive way and get no response, people look for more forceful weapons. That is perfectly true. But what I think is happening at the moment is that there is a dialogue nation by nation, binationally or between the Commission and the Japanese in order to try to find a way in which they will be persuaded. Now that seems to be the stage that we are at. We hope it never gets to a more confrontational situation.

E *If I may now shift to another front of Europe's foreign relations, I would*
I *like to have your views on the Euro-American relationship. This relationship over the last forty years has been based on defence. Today, because of the process of change in the Eastern bloc, the defence needs of Europe seem to be less important than in the past, and other issues are coming to the forefront of trans-Atlantic relations: for instance, the issue of cultural independence. The French attach to it a great deal of importance. The cultural identity of Europe has several aspects—the French stress television production, and the EEC Commission as well has gone rather far in the*

project of supporting a Europe-wide télévison sans frontières. In this area, isn't Britain in a kind of an anomalous position, as compared to the rest of Europe, because of the fact of having the same language as the USA, and in general, of being part of the English-speaking world? Is this condition one of more strength or more weakness, as far as an autonomos cultural personality is concerned? How do you perceive the importance of this?

Michael Heseltine - Let me say first of all that I doubt if it is within the gift of government to greatly influence these matters. The global market is having such a profound effect upon the tastes and assumptions and entertainment of people that the idea that government is going to protect the people by the regulation of the entertainment industry or communications just does not make sense. I do not think it can be made possible in a world of instant communications—satellite beaming and all of that. That is not in any way meant to diminish the cultural significance of Europe. I do not feel any doubts about the huge and fundamental contribution that is born of the European heritage, nor do I see any threat to it in the future. I would believe that the growing economic vigour of the European market will generate resources upon the back of which huge cultural advantages and patronage will be possible. I do not feel a need for governments to try and take an aggressive or assertive role in this. We have a culture, literature and arts in our heritage which is obviously at the front of human achievement. Why should that change? This is not realistic.

E Do you mean that society is capable of fighting its cultural fight
I by itself?

Michael Heseltine - Of course. And I am not referring only to entertainment, but to information and things like that as well. I think that the techniques that we are talking about spread through both entertainment and education. The idea that a marketplace of 320 million of our sort of people is not going to place an indelible stamp upon the evolution of the world is inconceivable

By the simple evolution of such a remarkably talented group of people, Europe will make its mark. People will earn equivalent sums of money in Europe as they do in America and the same freedoms will be available to them. I do not see large numbers of French people feeling that they have got to go to the United States to enjoy the full life that people associate with France. Many of us in Britain feel exactly the same about Britain. And I am sure it is true of

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Italians as well, and of course the other European peoples. That is not saying that quite a lot would not go, but then quite a lot of Americans come here and it is going to happen on a bigger scale. Entertainment is becoming global, and more so it will be.

E *What you see in the field of information and entertainment is not,*
I *therefore, a phenomenon of Americanisation, but a phenomenon of globalisation.*

Michael Heseltine - Yes.

E *In the field of education, do you feel that the story, on the other hand,*
I *might be different?*

Michael Heseltine - Well, I think that first of all, a large number of young people nowadays get most of their education from the entertainment industry. Television has more impact on what people know and what people think than our schools today. But that does not in any way absolve the nation-state from providing the quality of education that leads to the rounded citizen, but also fits society for the wealth of creative competition. Now I do think—as I say in my book—that Britain has something to learn here from our more advanced



competitors. We have not for a hundred years adapted our educational system to the competitive needs of today. We have made a significant improvement in the last decade, but there is a long way to go.

E *You seem to think that the British tradition of an education based on the classics is not sufficient. In your book *The Challenge of Europe*, you write something to the effect of: "Through the study of the classics, we have created a class of people capable of governing the empire". It was an actual historical occurrence; and it worked.*

Michael Heseltine - Yes, of course it worked, because we built an imperial power. It is a huge part of our background and a great source of pride. But the fact is that that is what our targets were all about. The French and the Germans moved towards a much more scientifically based educational system.

E *In a way, the Americans did this even more. They tended to constantly adapt their educational system according to the needs of the economic system, so that what happens now is that all the stress is on management. Since people with engineering degrees do not get very high positions in corporate boards, people tend to go into management more so than into Arts and Sciences. Isn't this part of the same phenomenon that you describe when you say that Britain is going too far into the financial and service activities, and neglecting manufacturing?*

Michael Heseltine - I do think it is an unacceptable concept that you let the manufacturing base deteriorate on the assumption that you will be compensated for this by the service industries. There is no rock of conviction on that argument and I think one of the consequences of a relatively under-educated society is that it tends to move towards the non-manufacturing base where you need the technical and scientific education significantly. In our society, many of the rewards are easier to achieve and higher in scale in the non-manufacturing sector than they are in the manufacturing sector. That will not be the case in some of the competing economies. We have not got the differentials right. Now there are many reasons for this, to do with our tax system as well as our educational system, but much of that is now changed. Today, people in the manufacturing industry are earning very large sums of money. If that continues to be the case and if we get the scientific and technical side of our education right and our training right, there is grounds for hoping that we will begin to redress something of the balance.

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E *What you suggest, then, is that science should be given a larger importance in European education, in British education.*

Michael Heseltine - What Europe has got to do is to ask itself the question about where the competition is going to be in the decades ahead, what are the Japanese going to be doing, what standards are they going to be achieving. And I mention Japan just in order to take one very obvious example, but there will be other countries that will follow the Japanese model, and with which we are going to be competing. There is no use in saying "Let's just compete with them today". We are going to compete with them in the future. We must know where they are going; we must try to achieve those targets and those attachments. It will be harder for Britain in some respects because we start from a lower base.

E *In a way, the whole of Western Europe should have a common educational project, which is a matter of public policy.*

Michael Heseltine - Well, I do not see a need for that. I think there is one sort of problem with the European issue and that is to make up your mind where you place your resources and where you put the political credibility. If you try to do all things in every field at once you may create a reaction against what you are doing—which I think would be against the wider European interest. There is absolutely no reason why there should not be a debate about the policy and standards for European education. My advice to the politicians would be to not to try to centralise education in a conformist way because you will create reactions that you will not find helpful.

In each country, when you get to the educational system, you are striking the heart of the national psyche. There is no purpose in doing that; it is counter-productive.

E *You would therefore keep in Europe a kind of pluralism of educational systems and even of educational projects.*

Michael Heseltine - I believe very strongly in the language of Winston Churchill, who described the answer to all these questions: Europe is about evolution. Address the issues you can address today thoroughly and properly, and make a success of these. That progress will itself change attitudes and progress may be easier in other fields once the attitudes are changed. If you try to change everything all at once, you are very likely to create an explosion of

tensions and recriminations which will be counter-productive. I would have thought that some of the political changes would be the last to follow if we ever get to the stage where they do. I would say this, too, is a long way down the road.

E *Then you do not think there is already sufficient dissatisfaction in the individual countries of Europe with the national identities to warrant the creation of a European educational system.*

Michael Heseltine - I have to say that I find no such dissatisfaction in this country. I know of no body of opinion asking for what you might call a "Europeanisation" of our educational system. This is not to say that our educational system is not capable of changing or does not need change, but I do not know anybody who is arguing that we should get the Europeans to do it for us, and I would very much doubt that there is anybody in Europe arguing that way about their national educational systems.

E *As far as I know, there is yet to be any significant body of opinion arguing in that way, but at least as far as countries such as France and Spain are concerned, what happens is that this dissatisfaction vis-à-vis national identity takes the shape of a resurrection of local identities, a demand for research and the study of local history, the protection of local environment...*

Michael Heseltine - Well, that is another way of saying what I am saying. The more you seem to be moving towards the centre, the more you will create local tensions.

E *... a sign of dissatisfaction with the nation-state as it is today. It is a symmetric escape or solution. Some people look at Europe, other people look at local traditions and cultures, but the dissatisfaction is the same.*

Michael Heseltine, a prominent Conservative MP since 1966, had been Minister of Defence up to 1986, when he resigned over a political disagreement with Mrs. Thatcher. His publications include *Where there is a will* (1987) and *The Challenge of Europe* (1989).

Michael Heseltine - I do not believe there is a dissatisfaction with the nation-state in Europe in the sense that you put it. I do not think Germans are dissatisfied with Germany or the French with France or the Italians with Italy. They have all got their complaints about their government because that is by definition what democracy does. You go to Italy and start saying they should run it like Spain or Greece and see what they say. You go to Germany and say it should be run by the French or come to Britain and say it should be run by the Germans and see what response you get. If Europe tries to push that argument or these concepts, it will create tensions, and indeed it might prove terminal in its impact on local communities. People have legitimate pride based on their own history and their own perceptions of national achievement. That is going to be as much a part of tomorrow's Europe as the sort of conformist, centralist economic arguments that are driving the Single Market.

E
I *Do you not believe that the national identity and national pride of the European countries are going to suffer serious problems in the coming years because of immigration from non-European countries? In France, for instance, a debate is presently raging over the impact on the national identity of the introduction of customs (poligamy, the wearing of the chador, sexual mutilations) that are typical of some immigrant communities with totally different religious background and behavioural codes. The Rushdie case, with crowds of British subjects asking for the banning of the book, has shown that the problem of what the Americans would call "unmeltable minorities" might exist in the UK as well. The European countries risk becoming an empty shell, where a kind of cultural and ethnic pluralism becomes a necessity. But in this case national identity ends up being a very dubious concept.*

Michael Heseltine - There is some truth to that. The US has the same sort of situation, and this really goes back to what we said about the world impact of the communications revolution. Of course you are right in saying that wherever you have so many cultures living side by side you are bound to have problems. Yet you cannot look to the future of the European concept based on the outpourings of one particular novelist. We in Britain have a problem of society, France has a problem of society, Germany has a problem of society. This is the way of the world. It is not going to go away. As long as prosperity continues I think the politics are very containable. If ever they cease to be, then history has not got many precedents from which to draw a comfortable lesson. All we know is that we seem to have enjoyed an unprecedented period of peace and prosperity. We better keep it that way.

E *In your book, you say that if Britain asks for some exceptions to EC regulations, this will only delay the closing of the gap that has for such a long time denied her of leading an influential role.....*

Michael Heseltine - What I am arguing in the book is that Britain, in the round, has more to gain and a bigger contribution to make if it is putting forward ideas at the front of the European movement and trying to influence Europe to go in directions which we think to be right and which would of course be compatible with our national self-interest. That is what other member countries are doing. But we will do it more effectively the more we are seen to be pursuing the concepts of a unified Europe, or the concepts of the European movement as opposed to when we appear to be against what the rest of Europe is trying to achieve.

E *One question that has appeared after the book's publishing is this result of the European elections and the change in the position of the Labour Party. The Labour Party has been traditionally the one that was opposed to all this. Now they perceive that this position has no force, does not work, but in a way they almost present themselves as more pro-European than the Conservatives. Is this just a trick or are they taking advantage of an opportunity provided by the Conservatives?*


Michael Heseltine - I think they have done a lot of polls. They have tested public opinion. They have discovered that along with most of their other policies the public will not put up with the things they have argued in the past. If they want to go along with those things, they can do so but they will not win the elections. I think they have made a strategic reappraisal. I happen to think a highly cynical reappraisal, a part of which is Europe, a part of which is the one-sided disarmament and now a discovery that capitalism has some virtues: it is all part of the same process, but I know full well that the more left wing orientated—of which Mr. Kinnock is one—all their lives have argued quite differently. So I am sceptic when suddenly they change their stance.

E *Of course, in addition, the ante has been upped, because when Gorbachev is declaring the virtues of capitalism, it becomes difficult...*

Michael Heseltine - True. I said in a recent speech that when the well of Marxist socialism has dried up, it is quite difficult for the Labour Party to drink from it.

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E₁ *Other consequences of this drying up of the Marxist well are the changes in the satellite countries and their clear longing to establish new ties with Western Europe. This is certainly a positive development, but one that is not without problems, given the already existing concerns that the European Community is growing too large. How do you see this? In the "Churchillian" approach to Europe, which you seem to share, any country that is democratic and European could be part of the EC. This would probably mean that we should consider the possibility of membership for Austria, and tomorrow for Hungary and Poland. This would change things radically.*



William Ewart Gladstone

Michael Heseltine - Speaking frankly, I do not see any way in which either Hungary or Poland is going to be in a position where it can join the European Community in the foreseeable future. Their economies are in quite serious difficulties, and they have no concept of how to run pluralist societies. I think that whilst there is reason to be very enthusiastic to see the political pluralism restored to those countries, the fact must be faced that for sometime now, the industrial and economical consequences of several decades of socialism will be very difficult to govern. In these countries there is simply no experience of how to run pluralist societies. Moreover, the debt levels that they presently have plus the inflationary pressures—such as in Poland—will just make economic matters extremely difficult.

What I am preoccupied about is that the West Europeans devote too much of their time and attention looking East, diverted by unrealistic issues such as an enlarging of the EEC. In other words, I am preoccupied by the possibility that the extraordinary transformation occurring in Soviet-dominated Europe could distract our people from the real challenge that confronts us, thus potentially slowing down our performance here in Western Europe. Indeed, in my view, the real challenge is the Pacific. There is the essence of our present and future problems, and one could probably say that the reason why in recent years there has been a revival of the European idea, why Europe got a new lease of life in the 1970's, is because we were falling behind the world's pace-makers.

We Western Europeans will never see ourselves as being a sort of philanthropic movement to raise the living standard of Central Europe, as important and politically desirable as that may be and unquestionably is. The real urgency for Western Europe is to find an answer to the new challenge of the industrial and economic might of the Pacific and to the scale of the North American economy.

E *Then as for this concentration of attention on Eastern Europe, how*
I *do you judge it?*

Michael Heseltine - There is indeed a lot of concentration, but I would be very surprised if it did not lead to some disappointments. People think we are going forward and we are not; we are going back to the nation-state, to the rivalries that have characterised Central Europe. We are looking at a period in which the might of the Russian Empire is under threat, where instability is the name of the future as I see it. Now there is plenty of historical experience for all of this, but all of it is dangerous, so if you add to that the economic threat of the

Pacific, you do not have any doubt in realising what I believe. We have got to pursue the completion of the marketplace in Western Europe, the maximisation of our own economic resources and the preservation of our determination to maintain credible defence policies in partnership with the Americans. I see no arguments that should persuade us to loosen adherence to the alliance. No matter how much we appreciate what Mr. Gorbachev is doing, the key question is how long Mr. Gorbachev is going to survive. That is the question—and what then? I will tell you this with absolute conviction: any successor to Mr. Gorbachev will step back and not forward.

EI *This is a new and interesting view. Of course we have to stick with our alliance because you do not see a substantial, radical change within. You see a kind of reorganisation of the empire. Is that what you say? How does this relate to the challenge of the Far East to the Atlantic Alliance?*

Michael Heseltine - Well, there is no economic threat to Western Europe from Eastern or Central Europe. Their economies are profoundly out of date and inefficient. There is no way in which they can challenge us at all. The Pacific is a real challenge—a huge challenge. First of all, I am not persuaded of the argument that the changes taking place outside Western Europe are permanent. I see some risks: no one knows what is going to happen. Grave risks: that means you do not change your defence policies. I see greater inefficiencies: I therefore question holding back what we are doing in any way that might be based on the argument that we have got to wait for them to catch up or anything of that sort. I believe that most of their problems are internal and there is very little the West can do that is going to affect the rate of progress. That is not to say we should not give some aid, we should not do a bit of training, that we should not invest. But it will all be very marginal to the problems that they face there. I am in favour of arms negotiations to lower and balance levels but as yet there has been no sign of reduction in the Soviet defence budget.


EI *Do you not also see some political instability coming from the re-awakening of Eastern Europe's nationalities.*

Michael Heseltine - Of course I do. There have been several historical attempts to contain Eastern Europe and all ended in tears. Among them, one possibility is that you have the hegemony of the Russian Empire. This was the latest settlement in that part of the world and, if that breaks up now, what we will have is a destabilised situation. It is not the question of looking to some

panacea for the future. The wise statesman looks to discover what happened in the past. And the lesson we can draw from history is that when all this ever happened it always meant trouble.

E *Let us look a second to what you said before. If the threat comes from the Pacific, this means that our alliance with the Americans not only has to be a military one. It has to be much more than that. It also means that we should avoid confrontation with the Americans in other fields, for instance in the field of commercial arrangements.*

Michael Heseltine - I would agree with that. I believe in continuing value of the alliance of the Atlantic, but based upon a more equal partnership. This is the view that you find commonly held in America: that Europe together could



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be a far more effective partner for America than Europe apart. There will of course be people in America who say "Keep them apart", because then "they will all be so weak and ineffective that we can then divide and rule". There will be Americans who say that, but not the wise Americans. The wise Americans will be saying "Let us see a stable and coherent Europe with resources that will enable us to do together what you can never do apart. And the partnerships we will have with that Europe will be increasingly more interesting than the ones we can have with a divided Europe".

This is the American view that I support. I do not in any way think my policies can be interpreted as anti-American or "America out" or anything of that sort. America twice this century has had to come to the rescue of Europe, and now that the postwar period is over, it would be just another step back into the uncertainties of the past if we were to sever the Atlantic connection.

E *What you define as the position of the wise Americans was the position of the past for having a Western Europe alliance—this was in terms of facing the Russian threat. Now if a new dimension is added then what do you do: the dimension of facing a new threat from the Pacific. The type of trans-Atlantic relationship has to change substantially.*

Michael Heseltine - Relationships are evolutionary: they do change. Think of what might happen if the fundamentalist upheaval in the Moslem world creates a new danger from the south; of how the defence problems of Europe would be transformed.

E *This evolutionary nature of foreign policy relationships is also visible in Europe. Here, in the first half of the century the Franco-British entente had been absolutely crucial to preserve liberty in Europe. In the second half, it has been the Franco-German entente that played a major role in preserving liberty and peace, as well. In both cases, however, there has always been in the background a strong tie with the US.*

Michael Heseltine - There is no question that the defence of Europe in the second part of the century has relied on America, on an alliance in which the US has played by far the major role. And it seems to me that it is in our evident self-interest that this should continue.

Of course, it would be a great improvement if the other pillar of this alliance could become stronger, through more strict cooperation among the European partners, but I do not see in any way how the role of the Americans could become of little relevance. Indeed, this is something I would be depressed and alarmed by, if such a development were to take place

E *Do you not see, among some Americans and possibly among some*
I *Germans, a tendency to believe that their relationship with the Russian might improve to the point that it would change nature, and actually take the central position in the international security system, pushing the Euro-American relationship to a secondary position. In other words, do you not see a trend for détente to become the prevailing entente in the last decade of the century?*

Michael Heseltine - There are certainly political forces at work in that direction, as in many other directions. But I do not find this idea attractive at all. I would not put those pushing for such a development in the category of wise political forces. This is a view I find quite dangerous. I see no grounds to rely on it.

E *How do you see the international role of the European democracies,*
I *namely Britain's role?*

Michael Heseltine - Foreign policy is a combination of economic resource and political imagination. If you have the economic resource, people listen to you simply because of the strength and clout which you possess. If they listen to you and your ideas make sense you are likely to influence people. If the views that Britain holds about the nature of Europe and the directions of Europe and the Atlantic partnership are based upon a Britain that is delivering economic success, then that is the platform on which we have a chance to influence Europe. I think that our voice is an essential feature of European thinking.