



## JOURNAL À PLUSIEURS VOIX

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# The Implications of German Unity

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**I**f any leader of the Soviet Union ever let its satellite peoples know that Soviet troops would not interfere with their search for a path of their own, then he would have the same effect as a sorcerer's apprentice. It would be impossible to control the forces he would set loose, at least without the use of force. Yet however important he might be, no individual man can spark off developments of this kind unless they are already part of a historical process. And even such an unusual statesman as Mikhail Gorbachev cannot create the world from scratch. Without a basis of détente, brought about by the fears of both superpowers for the destructive automatism of the armament race, signs of relaxation would hardly have swept through East European empire. It is true, word had got round that under the Communist system human needs were not to be satisfied—neither material nor cultural needs. But had not that been known for a long time? And why should the limits of tolerance have been reached just in 1988-1989?

The invasion of Afghanistan, martial law in Poland and the missile crisis at the beginning of the 1980's had undermined the capital of trust which the superpowers had paid each other for more than a decade. Yet dialogue never went below a certain minimum, nor did the Eastern bloc revert to what it had formerly been—a bloc of states based on order and obedience. The most striking symptom of this was the "German way"<sup>1</sup> which Honecker's GDR proceeded along almost unmolested: the inner contradiction of this policy of external *rapprochement* and domestic isolation, however, was only to be ignored for a limited while. The declared policy of the GDR became to

promote inner-German understanding and to avoid at all costs a return to a new version of the Cold War. Neither the Eastern nor the Western neighbours took any particular notice of this: on the contrary, the fact that the old German quarrel was no longer a burden to the international climate was welcomed in all quarters, and this inner-German accord benefited the Vienna talks from the beginning on. Satisfied and self-assured as they had become, however, Honecker and his clan closed their eyes to any possible repercussions of this.

### **Hopeless romantics**

And the Federal Republic? Whoever has been in power, West Germany has been constantly only too ready to feel that everything was for the best. Has there ever been criticism of living conditions within the GDR over the last two decades? Public opinion has been satisfied with a minimum of pan-German feeling and with improvements in the humanitarian field, which have been willingly and generously paid for, yet in doing so it has gradually but surely forgotten who and what it was dealing with. How else could the large parties have been so surprised, and even speechless, as the state between the Elbe and the Oder started to disintegrate?

The dramas of calculated risks had already been played out in the various theatres of the Cold War, as the new Kremlin leader was setting out even to remove the dust from the wings. It was neither his nor his advisors' intention to dismantle them. It had not been expected of him either at home or anywhere in the world, either by the left or by the right. Force of habit was strong, and the West was ignorant of the fact that things have their own dynamics. Those euphoric observers, who had only wanted to see the angel of peace and socialist reformer in Gorbachev, did not let themselves be affected by inner-Soviet needs, and fulfilled a certain longing of theirs with the beginnings of liberalisation in Hungary. They thought that, due to its particular internal constitution, Poland was a special case, and an exception which seemed to confirm the older, yet newly revived idea of a "third way". It was an idea of steps which could be controlled and directed, and of the belief that reform socialism within a country would promote stability outside its borders.

On the other hand, sceptical observers have long wanted to pin Gorbachev down as a representative of the constants of the Russian conquest instinct. They have listened to his lessons as a superior, and have not denied him respect. An unproductive mistrust has remained, however, regarding both his

general imponderableness and the earnestness of his reformist efforts. In any case, however earnest and well-thought out they might have been, Gorbachev's radically new propositions shook Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe, and opened new areas of liberty to its populations: this was clear by 1988 and was greeted with satisfied astonishment. However, even when faced with the reality of the situation, the Western protagonists of *Realpolitik* have not wanted to admit that moreover, the sixteen million inhabitants who live in Soviet occupied Germany should also have no less right to self-determination, and be no less freedom-loving and patient than the other peoples. It is hard to understand how the "German question", which has become the question of establishing democracy in the whole of Germany, can arouse so many spectres at the end of the twentieth century—spectres which belong to a dead and buried past.

### The "cause" before the means

Looking back on the year 1989, "the" people have really had their part. How else would revolutionary fever have risen so quickly, and been such a purifying force, if the people had not taken affairs into its own hands? And yet, had the people improved over the last forty years and suddenly seen reason? Or had they simply had more luck now and found circumstances favourable? More favourable than during previous years? In 1953 in the GDR, in 1956 in Hungary, and in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet troops had repressed attempts to throw off the socialist and Soviet yoke. This destiny was only spared the Poles because the superpower had left its soldiers on the borders in 1956, and because a general sacrificed himself in 1981 to ward off worse—in the form of invasion. When one day—as no other than Lech Walesa has stated<sup>2</sup>—the files are made public, Jaruselski will be established as a Polish patriot. Thus postwar history also has its tragic heroes.

For more than four decades the Soviet Union had crippled the peoples of Eastern and Central Europe in a way which only euphemistically could be described as guaranteeing its security interests. Which means would it not have been prepared to use? And was not socialism just a means to serve this end—a socialism, in any case, which had become "just an ordinary rubber riot baton"?<sup>3</sup> Was it not simply a cover under which any libertarian tendencies could be suffocated? Russian security interests today are much exaggerated and often misused. That they have no fixed extent has become evident over the past few months—through both political and military upheavals. However,



who wants to relapse into idealism and situate this extent in a no man's land of the mind? Perhaps it will only be possible to avoid melodramatic treatment of the issue when the effects of the Soviet imperialist grip, and consequent ideological haze, are also removed in the GDR, and when it becomes clear that Russian troops will not necessarily be used to impede the national self-determination of the Germans. Certainly not, if the extent and duration of military stationing are no longer held to be beyond discussion.

Russian affairs specialists will be able to solve the question as to precisely why socialism has found such solid anchorage in the Eastern superpower, why it would seem so unlikely to be surmounted there in any positive way, and why the system today appears to be toppling into anarchy. Scholars of religion, on the other hand, will explain how planning—spiritual or temporal—declines into terror, or in the best of cases into arbitrary domination, and why precisely those who want to render mankind happy end up in situations of abuse. There have been satraps in all epochs and in all countries, and the Quislings who prostituted themselves to Hitler were simply a particularly atrocious

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# Vorwärts

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Redaktion: 841, 68, Lindenstraße 69.  
 Geschäftsverwalter: Hans Wittenberg, Nr. 1904.

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## 110!

Unter dem Hufe des „Vorwärts“ stehen die Massen. Die breiten Straßen im Göttinger Viertel sind schwarz von Menschen und sie jubeln und jubeln. So oft ein sozialdemokratischer Sieg erklingt, wird, erschallen die Hufe und die Siegel folgen einander. Und immer begeisterter wird die Stimmung und Kampfgelänge erklingen.

Fünf Jahre sind es heute, da war auch Wahltag und da wurde das Wort von den Niedergerittenen gesprochen. Heute bei Wotoban die rote Fahne geht.

Sengbach ist hier dem Nationalliberalen Dr. Böttger unterlegen. Auch hier hat das Zentrum gegen den Vertreter der Arbeit gestimmt, keinen reaktionären Charakter deutlich offenbart. Das erleichtert unsern Kampf und sichert uns fünfliche Siege. Das Zentrum sieht da als der gefährlichste und tödlichste Arbeiterfeind und darüber werden auch seine proletarischen Anhänger bald zur Arbeit kommen. Verdankt doch Wotoban seine Wahl in Götting nur der Treue der nationalliberalen Schwärmer, ohne die er nicht

### Neugewählte Sozialdemokraten.

Zu den bisher gewählten 19 Sozialdemokraten sind folgende 11 hinzugezogen:

Elberfeld-Darmen	Ebert
Düsseldorf	Hoberland
Dortmund	Erdmann
Leipzig-Ramscheid	Tittmann
Sorau-Forsl	Schumann
Altena-Nieteln	Spiegel

version of this atrocious species of man. In the case of the dictator Stalin, however, the borderline between power and morality was unclear. Did he not have men at his service who had risked their lives and limbs under Hitler? These were men such as Bilak, who had taken part in the 1944 Slovakian uprising, and, as one of the last and worst Stalinists, only disappeared from the scene in 1989. Or like those GDR leaders—Honecker, Stoph, Sindermann or Axen—who had taken a lot upon themselves during the years after 1933, and who, after the battle against Hitler was won, repressed whoever stood in the way of their regime, under the aegis of anti-fascism. It is in the nature of parties with totalitarian claims that the latter have fallen victim to the very law they instilled.

Using the concept of “anti-fascism” arbitrarily and whenever it suits has become second nature to the Communist Party: as the Weimar Republic was dying and playing into the hands of the Nazis, as the Communists forced the Social-Democrats into a unitarian party in 1946, and yet again, more recently, as they tried to save whatever they could of their rule. Whether termed communist or socialist, “the cause” always had to justify whatever was needed, and whatever was needed was always decided by precisely those who represented “the cause”. Accusations of personal corruption have always (and not only recently) been found particularly useful and effective. Nothing is more evident than the fact that corruption is inherent to a one-party system, and that it leads it on to worse and worse crimes. Only when the Communist parties have sunk into insignificance will force and fancy lose the power to move men backwards and forwards like on a chessboard. A party involving a closed system either rules or falls, even though it falls by splitting up. It can neither offer anything more than a cosmetic facelift to the system, nor can it carry out reforms within itself. The Communist state parties in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and especially Romania fell as the unholy alliance between ideology and imperialism dissolved, and echo in the Western world was widespread and sympathetic. Why was another measure applied to the Communist state party in the GDR? Why did its disintegration provoke mixed feelings at best?

That the SED hung on to life for longer than expected, and that it tried to continue in its devious ways, has to be ascribed to its own skill, to external patience, and above all to Western charity. When Federal Chancellor Kohl visited Poland, he extolled the fact that he had waited until the country had a non-Communist head of government. With regard to the GDR he was not so



*The imperial eagle, 1871*

squeamish and settled for less. Both he and other Western politicians—German and foreign—have given more weight to the new GDR prime minister than the latter could ever have dreamed of. It cannot have only been a result of the fact of displaying modesty that the Modrow Government has had so much sympathy. It consoled the hearts of German democrats to think that it was impossible to help the second German state without the efforts and presence of the SED.

**SED, *sine qua non***

It was no coincidence that in 1945-46, Stalin's first wish was to bring his Western outpost—the part of Germany occupied by the Soviet army—under control. And the tool he used was the same that was subsequently to be applied to the other countries of the new empire: the forced unification of the Communists and Social-Democrats. Nowhere was this carried out so hurriedly and with such brutality as in the Soviet occupied zone: not in Poland nor in Hungary, and certainly not in Czechoslovakia where the CP was traditionally strong and did not need any formal unification (the Social-Democrats being simply absorbed). In the SED, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Stalin found the guarantors of German division. With their help he was able to assure his own empire of a part of Germany and thus to supply it with the Western cornerstone it needed. With the coming into being of the SED in April 1946, the gigantic split in the Social-Democratic Party was the first demonstrative



expression of the division of Germany. It is thus symbolic of reality that reunification is first and visibly possible with the re-establishment of the SPD on GDR territory. In the first case, it took exactly three years to "purge away" the former Social-Democrats (with the exception of a handful of opportunists) and turn the SED into a party of the Bolshevik kind. And only when the SED was ready for use as an instrument of power did Stalin call the GDR into being. From the moment of state foundation, the SED was the state party: or more properly, it was the party which possessed a state. In the summer of 1989, and before being destituted, when Otto Reinhold, then in charge of ideology, penetratingly declared that the GDR had no justification for existence without socialism,<sup>4</sup> he was only overstating the plain truth of this state of affairs.

The SED was the vehicle of socialism on German territory, and was a creation of the Soviets. Yet did not the same happen in the other countries of the empire? Did they not all carry the same banners, and was not one just as incapable of obtaining a majority as the other? For a short moment in 1968 it had looked as though Alexander Dubcek had really begun to liberalise his country, and on that occasion history really had gathered enough momentum to proceed without the Communist Party. So Brezhnev, understanding what was going on, sent in the tanks. Yet all in all the SED was a state party like the others, except in one respect. Alone, it represented a state which could not exist without that party and without the Soviet troops behind it. The power of attraction of West Germany was not discovered by the fellow-Germans of the Eastern part only in the summer of 1989, as the Hungarians opened the loophole in their border. To vote against their own system of government with their feet was not an idea Gorbachev had given them. Between 1945 and 1961, the Soviet zone (as it was still called) lost some three million Germans across the open lines dividing the Berlin sectors. In June of that fateful year, Kennedy and Krushchev met in Vienna and gave the clear impression that things were coming to a head, the consequence being that the exodus suddenly mounted. In July, 30,000 people fled, and it was even written that the zone would run empty, remaining a state with a party but with no citizens. The feeling that the Soviets—and with them the German Communists in their tow—would not continue to stand by and watch much longer, fell like a mist over the land between the Elbe and the Oder. On August 12, 1961, some two and a half thousand refugees registered in West Berlin, and the day after the Wall was built. It is ironic that both the building and opening of the Berlin Wall were determined by one and the same reason: to keep the people in the country!

“The despotism ruling the GDR was not sufficient to hold the state together as long as the Brandenburg Gate was open”, sentenced Golo Mann the year after the building of the Wall,<sup>5</sup> and today we have to admit that that same despotism was not sufficient, as long as the Gate was closed.

### **An illusory road**

The way out was closed for 28 years, but the compulsion for the citizens to resign themselves to the Wall never turned into any form of identification with it. It was no longer possible for the people to vote against it with their feet, nor had they the electoral urn, and communication lines were cut off. So the impression grew that the Soviet zone, from which the GDR would develop, was still alive and would last, and this impression was reinforced when the second German state was recognised by the first—the Federal Republic—as a fact, even though not a definitive one. Since then misunderstanding and faulty estimations have flourished, and not only within the regime, which by then felt sure of itself and could make concessions to inner-German freedom of movement over the course of many years. When Honecker felt ready not only to expel undesirable citizens but also to satisfy the wishes of discontented contemporaries to emigrate, he found himself flooded by applications to leave. And when two were permitted, twenty such applications followed. This legal wave of emigration, coming after the wave of the previous years had shown what was obvious to anyone who had the eyes to see, the ears to hear, and was not deceived by talk of common security interests: that forty years after its foundation, the GDR possessed as little sense of its own identity as in the dark years of its inception. Would the GDR have eventually achieved one if internal change had set in with time, and would a sense of identity still be possible? The question is without any real relevance, and was then only considered by those innovators who dreamed of a third road between socialism and capitalism. “Change has taken place in the wrong order,” sentenced Günter Grass from his heights, as things in the GDR started to move, and timidly revealed what he calls “widespread national sentiment”.<sup>6</sup> In any case, change has rapidly swept away the reservations the German left had regarding unification. Even Erhard Eppler would today no longer write what he was still writing at the end of the year, and claim that the GDR might have a chance in experimenting with some kind of democratic socialism.<sup>7</sup> It is certain that from now on, if a third course is to be followed, it must be an all-German one. In the left, desire and reality—symbolic of what happened in the GDR—are very far from each other.



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Discernment as to the lack of future for the GDR has spread late, and is still incomplete today. Contrary to the other Eastern bloc countries, opposition to the ruling SED had never been fundamental, and brought forth no leaders as uncompromising as Havel. How could it have been otherwise? Whoever crossed the regime was sent off to the West, whether he wanted to go or not, and—above all—discontent with material and cultural conditions found its outlet in nostalgic glances towards West Germany thanks to the omnipresence of television. With respect to the mass onslaughts during those November weekends, after freedom to travel had been given, some presentiment must have grown as to what this energy was directed at, and to what extent it had been bottled up. The border with the Federal Republic had always remained open in the minds of the people, and here, perhaps, lies the real reason why the GDR had never lost its sense of artificiality, and why the Havels and Walesas had not flourished on its territory.

The constant interplay of vicinity and distance, of repulsion and attraction, caused by the over-powerful Federal Republic has made life much more difficult for the opposition than in other countries. It is not just chance, then, if the GDR opposition has ecological and alternative tendencies, and if it lacks any real mass basis. For years, German unification had been a taboo in the GDR, and as a consequence had not been discussed in opposition circles. But it would have meant too much self-negation to admit that the entire state system was not worthwhile. It was necessary to work within the framework which everyone lived in, and it has only very recently been possible to break away from that framework. The pressure of the continuous refugee flow and of

the growing ramifications of declining SED rule was cramping the relationship between the two German states—a relationship which was daily getting closer and closer in the light of easier exchange between the two parts of the country, as between personal and institutional contacts. The overwhelming majority of GDR citizens wanted, and wants, liberty and prosperity, and has never had any scruples over taking its yardstick from the Federal Republic. It is no wonder, then, that regular parties developed all the more quickly as the elections got nearer and as opinions about the inevitable end, and prospects of the real end of SED rule grew.

Born in Leipzig and bred in Saxony, social-democracy had always been a national communion of feelings, bound to the state as a whole, and which only Stalin, after Hitler's atrocious repression, had violently torn apart. Yet the heritage which three quarters of a million Social-Democrat cardholders took with them on being obliged to join the SED was still as awake as the sense of national belonging in Social-Democrats on both sides of the border. Social-democracy was thus predestined to take over a leading role in the process of party formation, and thanks to this rapid self-affirmation not only the fall of the SED, but also organisation within the "bourgeois" camp, were accelerated. The other bloc parties also disintegrated at the same time; and why should a CDU not flourish on GDR territory, wiping from memory all recollections of a similarly named union, formerly faithful to the old regime? A nation grows along with, and even due to its parties.

### **Old habits**

As a result of strictly imposed division, the subject of unification had become a museum piece in the Federal Republic, and on all sides of the political spectrum, at the most, furnishing material for historical reflections. Why establish categories which in any case had no relation with reality? Yet only in the left could division liberate nostalgic policies which included the plea for the continued existence of the GDR. For the left, the GDR became the land where many real or presumed deficiencies, and discontent with the system and the public sentiment it provokes, seemed to have been resolved. Bonn's first permanent representative in the GDR, Günter Gaus, who lost some focus on Honecker's state due to this job, described the place "where Germany really is", between the Elbe and the Oder, as a garden suburb paradise, and painted "the world of the West Germans" in a gloomy light.<sup>8</sup> This was a model which was willingly imitated, and reinforced a tendency which was inherent in the

fact of the country's division, which primarily amounted to considering the two social systems on an equal moral basis, and secondly to interpreting the meaning of the two state destiny as punishment for Nazi crimes.

In Potsdam in 1945, the victorious powers decided to divide Germany into occupied zones, but to administrate them together. They did not, however, decide to divide Germany forever because it had such great harm to the world. The statements regarding unity as made by the USA, Great Britain and France in the 1954 German treaty, and on the occasion of the annual NATO conferences would otherwise not be comprehensible.

Today the SPD will also recall that the epoch of dual state status is a thing of the past, that unification is getting more topical, and that it was first against greater Western integration precisely because division had not to be reinforced. And the SPD will also recall Herbert Wehner's plan for Germany, which had already proposed a confederation of the two German states in 1959. Dual state status was thus only conceptually decided and retrospectively projected back into the past after the Wall was built and the other state seemed secure.

In the German left, in the German Protestant Church, and thus in the CDU, the famous act of kneeling before the Warsaw ghetto has led to great misunderstanding: as if through this symbolic gesture, this plea for forgiveness, *Ostpolitik* had been determined and the division of Germany had been accepted as the punishment of history. This is the reason why various essential motives behind *Ostpolitik* have been forgotten: for the sake of keeping the nation one, some movement had to be made in the mummified diplomatic situation, and the *status quo* had to be recognised.


Great political changes such as those set about by *Ostpolitik* are never without contradictions, however, and the bills they present never work out. As long as the Soviets had the say, humanitarian achievements could only be made with the SED regime. When it became clear during the summer of 1989 that foreign troops would no longer prevent independent developments, and that it could only be a question of time before the Germans also took to the streets, Willy Brandt both logically and laconically declared that the policy of gradual steps was over.<sup>9</sup>

During the long period of twenty years which the gradual step policy lasted, it was almost inevitable that the world would get used to existing relations, as



also to the East Berlin leadership and this also included the Christian Democratic Union, which had obviously followed the thread of *Ostpolitik*. But then the CDU had the advantage of being in power, and thus being immune to the temptation to overplay pragmatic steps into ideological or academic exercises. Moreover, in the 1980's the left had discovered the concept of "common security", from then on making nuclear weapons the blatant evil of the situation. Striving towards common security, however, meant that the left placed its view on the question of internal conditions in the other state in second place. It then blurred real focus on the domestic reality in the Warsaw Pact countries, which was considered to be a constant even when it no longer was; and finally, it misled the left into assuming the equal power-political and moral value of the social systems of both alliances.

Today there is the belief that both the Warsaw Pact and Atlantic Alliance are going to have to disappear before the "German question" can be resolved. Habituation to the external and internal *status quo*, inherent in *Ostpolitik*,



*Attacking the Wall*

was profound, though not so profound that new events might not rapidly establish new norms.

### **One Germany, one Europe, one roof**

Nothing created by man is imperative or lasting, and thus everything is possible: that peoples who have gladly and energetically done away with their Communist regimes cannot find their paths to liberty and prosperity quickly enough, and thus flounder in the midst of political and economic chaos; that the legacy is too heavy, and new *Conducators* establish new ruling systems; that in the Soviet Union, already a powder keg for too long, the spark which could blow it all into the air might be extinguished by force. Declining empires follow their own rules, though studying them does not take us much further, for history has not yet known declining empires in possession of nuclear capability. Everything is possible, and thus it is also possible that in a moment when the superpower USSR is looking inwards, the Germans do what it is in the nature of things to do, and settle themselves under one roof.

It does not only depend on the Soviet Union. Germany has many neighbours, and the shrillest complaints do not come from an Eastern direction: that a united Germany might get too large and powerful; that it has always done harm, and—as the insinuation goes—it will continue to do harm in the future; that unification is contrary to West European unity, and that the latter should have precedence. The arguments to be heard without any beating around the bush in the public opinion sectors of Western neighbours and in the public statements of Western politicians—though almost not at all in the people—demonstrate a considerable ability to abstract, and will produce a nationalist backlash sooner or later. It is difficult to understand why the present German state, in which 80 per cent of the Germans live, is amongst the most respected in the world, whereas a future Germany, in which 100 per cent live, should be a misfortune. Postwar German democracy, which in forty years has lost none of its attractiveness to fellow German citizens beyond the Elbe, is as stable and simultaneously as threatened as the other Western democracies. The common roof which the Germans are looking for will protect a democratic household, and no other. Unification, today already underway, is unification on Western conditions. There has never been this opportunity, and it is for this reason that SPD memories of the 1950's only lead to error. Then it was a question of unification—if it really was—under neutral status and with some kind of third way.

The Nazi dictatorship grew out of a people broken in many senses—sick in its economic heart and political soul—and this is already sufficient reason to exclude any possible connections with it. Since then, two generations have grown up, and have born the responsibility for everything which has happened, even though they face the world freely, and though no one in the world expects anything special of them. There is also no place where they would not be welcome today. So how should it be the Germans to harbour desires of superiority and predominance? At the EEC summit in Strasbourg it was written in the protocol that “this process” (by which the process leading to unification is meant) should be accomplished “in a democratic and peaceful way”. More than a few Germans rubbed their eyes at this: just what was being implied here, and with regard to whom?

The overwhelming majority of the Federal German population, along with the politicians above them, would not even dream of casting doubt on the West European community for the sake of their national unity. That both are desirable and feasible is the hope of the nation, and the general feeling of the latter was expressed by Alfred Herrhausen in one of his last interviews: to the question as to whether German unity would not mean turning away from the Common Market, he answered “Just the opposite. If the only difference is that the internal market will include 75 million Germans instead of 60 million, then we must certainly not put a halt to the process for this reason.”<sup>10</sup> Who could possibly fear German solo flights in a process involving progressive integration and increasing limitation of sovereignty? And the other side of the coin is equally comprehensible and removed from all political conflict: within the EEC, Germany will not be able to decide its lot alone—neither its future in general, nor its military status in particular. And apart from the superpowers, which country in the world today could act as though it were only answerable to itself? Just posing this very question already removes some of the drama from the German issue. The nation will settle down together in one community, that is true, but it is doing so at a time in which supra-national structures are increasingly influencing reality, and are hardly avoidable any longer. Why even think in terms of disqualification and the like, then, and arouse spectres which belong to the second half of the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth?

In the wake of conventional disarmament, the part of Europe formerly ruled by the Soviets has acquired new contours. And in turn, political change influences strategic thinking, and fundamentally—though temporarily with uncertain



consequences for military alliances—and either politics or strategy always possesses and creates stability. The Federal Republic will belong to NATO until European security has established its own framework. The Germans will not just wait for this to happen, however, but will encourage the Europeans to hurry on, even though reluctantly. That European unification must precede German unification is written nowhere. And history in any case does not follow orders of priority blueprinted for use. Why should everything always be solved in advance, and at the same time?

### References

- <sup>1</sup> - In the presence of certain selected guests, Honecker used to put a bottle of vodka of the Gorbachev brand on the table, and comment: "We are following the German road".
- <sup>2</sup> - Said on September 7, 1989, in the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Bonn.
- <sup>3</sup> - Vaclav Havel in his vote of thanks after the presentation of German Publishers' Peace Prize, the *Börsenblatt*, October 17, 1989.
- <sup>4</sup> - In a speech on August 19, 1989, published in the *DDR-Spiegel* of August 22, 1989.
- <sup>5</sup> - Mann, Golo: *Der Verlorene Krieg und die Folgen*, in *Bestandsaufnahme. Eine Deutsche Bilanz 1962*, published by Hans-Werner Richter in Munich, Basle and Vienna, 1962, pp. 29-54, quotation p. 34.
- <sup>6</sup> - In *Der Spiegel* of November 20, 1989, and in the report of the SPD Party Conference on November 18, 1989.
- <sup>7</sup> - "Ist die DDR zu retten?", in *Die Zeit* of November 24, 1989.
- <sup>8</sup> - Gaus, Günter: *Wo Deutschland liegt. Eine Ortsbestimmung*, Hamburg, 1983, and the same in *Die Welt der Westdeutschen. Kritische Betrachtungen*, Cologne, 1986. Cf. also the discussion by Michael Stürmer in *Der Spiegel* of January 26, 1987.
- <sup>9</sup> - In a speech before the German Parliament on September 1, 1989.
- <sup>10</sup> - In *Der Spiegel* of November 20, 1989.