

# Tradition and Revolution in Islam

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**I**slamic fundamentalism, seen as a return to the strict application of the Shariat (the Moslem law), is as old as Islam itself. Yet the Moslem world witnessed in the 1970s the explosion of a radical and revolutionary Islam, which condemned established regimes, including Moslem ones, in the name of a political claim for an "Islamic state", born by revolution.

This Islamic movement is in a sense the synthesis between the Islamic religion and the vast liberation movements of the Third World, inspired by a Marxist vision of history and a Leninist vision of political organisation (a unique vanguard party, a violent state-sponsored take-over of power, the establishment of a classless society), a synthesis explicitly branded as "Islamic ideology" by its supporters. In the Iranian Islamic revolution and in the radical Egyptian movements which murdered Sadat, political need (Islamic state) won in the face of the strict legalism of the traditional Ulemas.

Yet the war between Iran and Iraq and, in general, the failure of revolutionary Islam have once again blurred the borders between Islam and traditional fundamentalism. The populist slogan to "come back to Islam" still remains suggestive in mobilising the Moslem masses, but today it takes on a new expression: it is conservative, polymorphism, with a socio-economic rather

than a political vocation. It focuses on political integration, working deeply within society before attempting any questioning of the state; but it is just as violently anti-Western as revolutionary Islam could be.

The Islamic movements have gone through a profound change in the 1980s: the political revolutionary model aimed at taking over the state through violent action in the Iranian way has been replaced by a strategy of "re-Islamisation" from the bottom of society, in its customs, culture and behaviour, with the possibility of leading, as in the case of Algeria, to the establishment of a mass political party, integrated into the political game. Without necessarily putting into question its current form, this movement demands that the state guarantee, validate and even impose the Islamic way of life. Violence in this case is punctual and local, playing more on pressure vis-à-vis other Moslems than on a call for revolutionary struggle, this being the lot of minority extremists.

This evolution is not a simple return to the traditional fundamentalism of religious men<sup>1</sup>, as it brings on the scene militants who remain quite distant by their origin and training from the traditional clergy; they are in fact closer to the Islamic movements, the Sunnite Moslem Brothers or the Iranian "Hezbollahs" (at times they are simply ex-members), even if they are more numerous, less politicised and better integrated.

Finally, this evolution leads to a variety of answers in the different states it touches, usually going in the direction of concession—in the hope of recovering a movement with more limited objectives than that of revolutionary Islam—and to a careful opening of the political game to Islamic parties, especially through elections which never before were free, as in Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt. The holy union between the conservative states against the Islamic threat is no longer valid, especially after the Gulf war. But above all, this evolution corresponds to a change in the role of Moslem countries: in the 1980s, Saudi Arabia tried, by financing neo-fundamentalist networks, to regain the privileged position it had lost somewhat in the past decade to the Iranian and Libyan militants. But these networks massively joined the camp of Saddam Hussein after the arrival of American troops in Saudi Arabia.

The neo-fundamentalist movement has also brought a solution to a contradiction which the Iranian-style Islam had never been able to resolve: that of the Islamic minorities, and specifically, that of immigrants in European countries. The Iranian model did not have any impact in immigrant circles. By putting at the forefront of its claim the "Islamic revolution", the Iranian model presupposed the existence of a society with a Moslem majority, whereas neo-fundamentalism, because it works on daily life and on elementary social relations, can easily adapt itself to a non-Moslem state, to the point, as in the French case of the "Islamic veil affair"<sup>2</sup>, where it is able to put forth to a (culturally) Christian and (politically) anti-clerical state the same claims it addresses to the Egyptian or Algerian state: the recognition and the legalisation of "Islamic spaces".

### **Inner city audience**

The failure of the revolutionary model is first of all the failure of the Iranian revolution, which is linked to two dates: September 1980 and June 1989. The war with Iraq definitively identified the Iranian revolution with Shi'ism and Iranian nationalism: the Arab masses thus turned away from this model. The exportation of the revolution was limited, in a partial manner, to the Shiite ghettos of Lebanon and Afghanistan.

A general movement to remove ideology materialised in the Shiite communities, in spite of the connection to the references for legitimacy (Hussein's martyrdom, the figure of Khomeini). On the other hand, while fighting a battle against the Islamic extremists, the conservative Arab countries have buried re-Islamisation and have tried to manipulate the fundamental Sunnite non-revolutionary groups, the Moslem Brothers or the Wahhabis, for foreign policy purposes. The death of Khomeini in June 1989 took away the charismatic leader from what was left of the revolutionary movement. The return of pragmatism in Iran itself has taken away all the prestige from the only Islamic revolution which had come to power.

The problems which gave birth to revolutionary Islam on the whole nevertheless are still present in the Moslem world. The social problems are



worsening everywhere: demographic growth and rural exodus continue to increase the population of already bursting cities in which the state is incapable of guaranteeing public services, even the most basic. At the same time, development of schooling, combined with budgetary restrictions and therefore a decrease in government-sponsored employment possibilities has lead to the extension of a frustrated (no work opportunities in their professions) intellectual proletariat. Not only are there no outlets to meet their expectations, but the living conditions in their universities are worsening, thus making them available, as militants first and then as leaders, for any protest action.<sup>3</sup>

In the context of a drive for modernisation conducted according to "Western" criteria (technology, consumption, mass media, and also borrowing political and legal structures, if not perhaps the values of democracy) and in the face of the failure of universalist ideologies (Marxism, "Arab socialism", Third World solidarity), a new identity crisis has appeared, leading to the search for new values in the mythical past of the first periods of the Islamic movement.

The analogies are striking between these effervescent circles in the Moslem countries and among the immigrants in Europe: they live in the most degenerate neighbourhoods, they are going through an identity crisis, and the youth is faced with an absence of social prospects.

Islam thus remains the strongest of legitimating values and mobilising forces, but, unlike the movements of the 1970s and the early 1980s, its supporters do not automatically denounce the established governments as unholy and incapable of promoting Islam. Rather, they demand that the governments themselves promote Islamisation by relevant legislation, implemented by the public authority. The ideal is not to take over the state, but to transform society and thus its political form through a revival of customs and a return to individual worship, be it free or imposed. The state is a means and not an end. The contrast is striking between Islamic Iran, where one sees almost no one praying in the streets, and the new Islamic neighbourhoods of the anti-clerical republics (Tunisia, Turkey), where some streets are nearly closed down to cars by crowds of praying men.

### Growing from the grassroots

The militants are usually unemployed intellectuals who often have begun scientific studies, and are self-taught in matters of religion and political thought. It is hard to find a true mullah. But the recent development of "Islamic training centres" which now churn out "preachers", in the framework of movements such as the Tabliq, put on the market better trained militants, who are well-schooled in the techniques of "da'awat"-militant preaching, the most effective weapon of the movement.

Through preaching, the militants try to convince individuals to come back to the practice of Islam in their daily lives (prayers, fasts, but also exclusive consumption of "Hallal" food, and the wearing of the veil for women), while accompanying this with grassroots socialisation: meeting places, clubs, book-lending, classes for children, cooperatives, and establishment of alternative (non-mixed) common transportation.

At the same time, this new way of preaching focuses on campaigns against popular Islam: Marabouts, music, mysticism, syncretism and tolerance. The new militants preach formalism and living by the Koran, and they fight against the philosopher's Islam. Even if they are not all Wahhabis, it is the school of Ibn Taymia which they favour, the most formalist of all schools of jurisprudence and Moslem theology.

In fact, this return to traditional fundamentalism has lost the revolutionary and Third World biases which had been a characteristic of the Islamic revolution. For the neo-fundamentalists, the reform of society passes through the reform of morality, through the implementation of the Shariat, and not through a change in the forms of power. That is why the establishment of "Islamic spaces" prior to state action is not only tactical in nature, it also corresponds to the vision of the neo-fundamentalists: it is useless to pass new laws if Moslems themselves first do not come back individually to the practice of "real Islam".

The only modern elements which remain are a social doctrine (based on mutual support) and the will to integrate technology.

This denial of a broad political strategy explains the polymorphous of the public expression of neo-fundamentalism. First, there are a certain number of private associations with the international vocation of a preaching and non-political nature, of which the "Jama'at ul Tabligh" (with its headquarters in India) is the most well known, and a branch in France called "Foi et Pratique".<sup>4</sup> These associations often originate from non-Arabic countries (India, Sudan), but receive Saudi funding. A second form of expression is that of the political parties established on national bases, without any type of "comintern" structure, but also often generously funded by Saudi finances. These parties generally have been founded by former Islamic militants who have given up violent activism and have become partisans of the peaceful take-over of power which they consider now to be possible. Examples are the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, the En-Nahda movement in Tunisia, and the organisations of "Moslem Brothers" in Jordan and Egypt.

### Born-again Moslems

The task at hand is to organise "Islamic spaces" in society, governed by the principles which the movement would like to have applied to all of society: specifically, the respect of a personal code of conduct and not the establishment of a political counter-state. This counter-society does not offer the image of a counter-state, as in the areas liberated by Marxist guerillas; it is rather the realisation of a "new man (or woman)", a "born-again Moslem". In the second phase, the movement tries to obtain the recognition of these spaces, and in the third phase, tries to extend the principles on which they have been founded to the whole of society. Once a favourable field of play has been selected, the movement imposes partial measures by local pressure, and then negotiates with the state to recognise and generalise the *fait accompli*. In these spaces, women are urged to wear veils, alcohol is banned, fraternising between the sexes is condemned and there is the struggle to promote the moralisation of society (very close in that sense to Christian fundamentalists) by fighting against "pornography", gambling, bars, music, drugs and delinquency. Another arm of the struggle is the requirement to adapt daily life to the practice of Islam (free time for prayers, "Hallal" food, special schedules during Ramadan). Finally, one of the priorities is the



adaptation of the schooling system to Islam (prohibition of impious subject matters, no mixing of the sexes, Arabisation). In other words, one tries to establish an authentic Moslem micro-society in a society which is no longer Moslem or has yet to become so. These methods in varying degrees are adaptable to European societies where Moslems live as a minority and are more or less kept in ghettos.

The "Creil method"<sup>5</sup> is in fact a good example of the strategy used by neo-fundamentalists: first create a *fait accompli* (have the young Moslem women wear the veil), and then work on the community starting with its weakest members, calling upon values which are not always Islamic (the fear of "gossip", the call to honour) and using, in the end, the community as a pressure lever towards one's own members in order, in the last phase, to force the state to "legalise" this Islamic space. This explains why neo-fundamentalists rather willingly play by the rules of the institutional game (establishment of declared associations, trials, references to human rights).

The techniques are those of preaching door-to-door or in informal worship spaces. One plays on the sense of guilt of the Moslem who has stopped practicing, on his "existential crisis", on the image of dignity in a decaying universe, on anti-Westernisation.

In Moslem countries, the neo-fundamentalists mitigate the insufficiencies of the state by setting up mutual aid networks (non-mixed bus services for women students, the circulation of pamphlets).

Because of this method, the results are varied. In fact, the establishment of "fundamentalist pockets" occurs more often depending on social areas and especially regions, than on states. Where the social context and the tradition welcome neo-fundamentalists, they impose their will without giving state a chance to speak its own mind. These bastions are sometimes regional (Upper Egypt, Erzurum in Turkey, NWFP in Pakistan, the Moslem immigrants in Great Britain), but on the whole, it is the working-class neighbourhoods of the large cities which are the most propitious for neo-fundamentalism.

### The Koran has an answer for everything

The Moslem states do not have a project for society with which to counter the fundamentalists; ironically, it is the European countries that can propose to their Moslems other models. What is worse, it is hard to see how the social and economic problems which prevail today in the Moslem countries could be solved in the short term.



*The Imam's guard*

The states try to disarm the fundamentalists with symbolic answers, in a piecemeal fashion, but also through an attempt at political integration (with the exception, of course, of the two lay dictatorships of Syria and Iraq),



accompanied at times by a very punctual repression of the most violent demonstrations. Beginning in 1980, the states which up until then had implemented legislation without taking the Shariat into account (or only to mention it in the texts), started proclaiming openly to be of the Shariat (1982: family code in Algeria; 1985: Shariat bill in Pakistan). But no brutal political change ever occurs. One sees the same governments who earlier referred to Arab socialism, nationalism or anti-clericalism, proclaiming today that they belong to the Shariat. The question of the place of Islam is rarely the object of a competition between two political forces, one Islamic and the other lay. In Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia, it is the established regimes which "Islamise" their prose and their practices. In Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto had clearly withheld, before her eviction, from abolishing the "Shariatic" legislation, and pointed out on the contrary in all her speeches that it was her father, Ali Bhutto, not General Zia, who had introduced the concept of Islamisation into the Pakistani Constitution.

Thus, the governments act as mere opportunists. Turkey is a case on its own, since anti-clericalism is written in the constitution, but without saying it, the state makes concessions to the local power relations (the veil is allowed in some universities, while it is forbidden in others). In fact, the result is ambiguous: the concessions made to neo-fundamentalists have not reduced their influence. The only positive point is that aside from the two absolute and completely secular dictatorships of Iraq and Syria, the concessions of the state in the other Moslem countries have facilitated the reintegration of neo-fundamentalists into the political game, thus contributing to distancing them from the revolutionary model. It is clear in Jordan and Egypt. But at the same time, the concessions to the Islamic movement often only follow the rise of the fundamentalists, as is particularly evident in Algeria, where the Islamic Salvation Front (ISF), in the face of a discredited Front for National Liberation, was able to gain the absolute majority of votes at the June 1990 municipal elections.

The reintegration of the neo-fundamentalists into the political realm helps to moderate them, but it also gives them the possibility to take power legally and thus implement a programme of Islamisation from the top. The result probably would be closer to Saudi Arabia or General Zia's Pakistan than to Iran: in other

words, Islamisation would be obtained through law rather than through revolution, and would focus on the civil and penal code, rather than on questioning the economic and sociological foundations of society, thus letting the current socio-economic problems remain the same or worsen. To summarise, the political programme of the neo-fundamentalist parties, which could eventually take power, proposes a political discourse only because many of their leaders are ex-Islamic revolutionaries, but their regimes would not employ tactics much different from the current techniques used to establish Islamic spaces: they would merely be doing so on a national level. The political and economic order would be hidden behind slogans such as "The Koran has an answer for everything", but there would not be any remodelling of society.

### **Poor investment strategy**

Saudi Arabia financed neo-fundamentalist networks throughout the world with the avowed goal of opposing the influence of Iran. Now, one of the long-term geo-strategic consequences of the Gulf war is an anti-Western radicalisation of the fundamentalist circles hitherto were conservative, but which rapidly have passed from Saudi allegiance to unconditional support of Saddam Hussein; it is they who now replace the anti-imperialists of the past in mobilising masses and producing the symbols of protest.

This anti-Western radicalisation is happening, of course, under the pressure of a frustrated Arab public opinion, but it is also the consequence of a reversal of the Islamic networks which were pro-Saudi, especially in the case of the Jordanian Moslem Brothers, who play a key function in Southern Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh). This reversal is helped by the fact that in the 1980s, the Islamic ranks often were expanded by former Arab nationalist militants, disillusioned by secular ideologies, who today meet up again with their old loves without giving up Islamic rhetoric, the latter having proven itself better adapted in crowd mobilisation. The synthesis between Islam and "Third-Worldism" that Iran had not been capable of transmitting to the Moslem masses is taking place thanks to the very networks the Saudis had financed to counter Iran. This radicalisation is not leading to the establishment of an "Islamic International", but rather to the emergence of national Islamic

movements, which exercise their influence within existing states. The governments in these countries are thus obliged to "ride the tiger" and to make theirs the denunciation of these "new crusaders"; but rather conservative governments were aided in reconstituting an Islamic or Arab virginity by siding with Iraq (Tunisia, Jordan, Algeria, Yemen).

Relying on the legitimacy constituted in the control of the holy places, yet handicapped by its linkage to Wahhabism, which is rejected by a large part of the Sunnite Ulemas, Saudi Arabia tried with its petro-dollars to develop a strictly fundamentalist religious propaganda, without facing the question of political power. It is in this context that the Rabita was created in 1962, the "World Islamic League". So as not to abandon to Iran the monopoly of fundamentalist protest, Saudi Arabia from 1980 on had spread its action by encouraging in a more or less imperious manner the creation of fundamentalist and conservative networks essentially aimed at the non-Arab countries or at the immigrants in Europe. However, because of a lack of leaders and because the Wahhabi doctrine often met with fierce opposition on behalf of the traditionalist Sunnite mullahs, the Saudis depended on Sunnite networks financed on the basis of personal relations or through privileged links, rather than on using a well thought-out strategy. Saudi Arabia thus found itself to be financing either fundamentalist networks which were conservative but violently anti-Western (for reasons that were more cultural than political), or Islamic groups much more radical to the point of even claiming political power, but seemingly more capable of preventing Iran from occupying the whole field of protest (for example, the Hezbi Islami in Afghanistan).

The Saudis depended mainly on the Arab Moslem Brothers, who were very often Jordanians of Palestinian origin; although they claimed allegiance to the movement lead by the Talmassani Sheikhs, and at their death, to Abul Nasr, they were in fact more radical than the Egyptian leadership of the Moslem Brothers.<sup>6</sup> There are, of course, important differences on the doctrinaire level between the Moslem Brothers and Wahhabi, but their common reference to Hannibalism, and their strong opposition to Shi'ism and to popular piety (the worship of "Saints") gave them common themes for reformist and puritanical preaching.



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The Moslem Brothers committed themselves not to have activities in Saudi Arabia itself. It was often Kuwait that acted as a meeting point for relations between the Moslem Brothers and the Saudis. For their bases in Southern Asia, the Moslem Brothers also used movements which were long since established on an autochthonous basis (Jama'at Islami, Jama'at ul Tabligh). But the correspondence of views between the Moslem Brothers and Abul Ala Maudidi, the founder of Jama'at Islami in Pakistan, has lead the movement to be seen as a sister organisation by the Moslem Brothers. The action of all these movements at first was aimed at the re-Islamisation of society rather than at the creation of "Islamic states" through revolution; the advent of an "Islamic society" would have to come about through continuous pressure on the state, which ever it is, in order that it apply the Shariat, and by the creation of a "vanguard" of "pure men" who would establish a real Islamic community among themselves. This conservatism helped these movements to be accepted by conservative regimes as well as by the Americans, who armed the Afghan Hezbi Islami from 1980 to 1989. In Egypt, Jordan and Pakistan these circles obtained great influence behind the scenes of the political world, acting more like an Opus Dei than a real political party. Elsewhere, however, a radicalisaiton of these movements was taking place, at times by analogy to the the Islamic revolution in Iran. The borderlines between conservative fundamentalism and political Islam became blurred.

The majority of operational leaders abroad came from Amman, where the guide of the Moslem Brothers is Aburrahman Khalifa, whereas the funds came from Saudi Arabia. The Moslem Brothers who were active in the Afghan resistance are the same who later would be seen in central Soviet Asia and in

Baghdad. It is this nucleus which later joined Saddam Hussein, bringing along a few thousand young Arabs who had fought in the ranks of the Afghan Mujahidins and who were more international (many of them from the Maghreb) than the leaders (most often Jordanian Palestinians). In Peshawar, the office of the Moslem Brothers was directed by Abdullah Ezzam (a Jordanian Palestinian murdered in November 1989), who in turn recognised as "murshid" (spiritual leader), Mohammad Abul Nasr, the leader of the Egyptian Moslem Brothers; it is through the latter that a large part of Saudi funds arrived. Sayyaf, the "Prime Minister" of the transition Afghan Government, according to certain sources, is the only non-Arab member of the world directory of Moslem Brothers. The Hezbi Islami of Hekmatyar is structured along the same organisational pattern as the Moslem Brothers. The Pakistani party Jama'at ul Islami, while not an official member of the Moslem Brothers organisation, is considered by the latter to be a brother party: it shares its ideology, organisation and strategy. One can find in this movement Moslem Brothers from Jordan, Syria, the Palestinian Hamas, the Pakistani Jama'at (and probably its Bangladeshi and Cashmir equivalents), the "Islamic party" of Malaysia, and the Hezbi Islami in Afghanistan. The Egyptian Moslem Brothers seem to keep their distance from this international activism.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia has financed both a network of Mosques in the countries of immigration, and, within Arab countries, movements with no organisational links to the Moslem Brothers, such as the Algerian ISF (whereas the Moslem Brothers support the movement of Sheikh Nahna) and the Tunisian En-Nahda.

If it is true that these movements (Moslem Brothers as well as Mosque networks), financed but not controlled by the Saudis, have effectively countered Iranian influence, they also have developed very violent "anti-Christian" (in Afghanistan, there is a campaign against Western humanitarian assistance) and anti-Zionist—if not downright anti-Semitic—doctrine and propaganda. Being essentially Arab, they lead a crusade for the return to a pure form of Islam, free of all syncretism or external influences and values, be they mystical or simply the fruit of Western "materialism". They are against the integration of immigrants, urge the creation of "Islamic spaces" in Western

countries, and wage a merciless war against the “renegades” (those at the origin of the “Rushdie Affair”, and the “veil affair” at the Creil school).

These networks are not centralised: the political influence of one of Moslem Brothers, the Egyptian Abul Nasr, seems weak. But the weight of the Palestinians bearing Jordanian passports has given them cohesion. There is an alliance between a Palestinian nucleus and Islam in the periphery (Pakistan, Sudan, Mauritania, and even Mauritius) to focus the propaganda on a critique of the West. What represented a tactic for the Saudis (to adopt a radical discourse in order to better counter Iran), has become a strategy for the Moslem Brothers (to fight Westernisation, since the communist danger has disappeared). The Americans had accepted as a lesser evil the cultural anti-Westernism of the Moslem Brothers and of all conservative fundamentalists, because they seemed to represent above all an obstacle to the expansion of Iran and the USSR—a short-sighted policy, to say the least.

### **Fickle allegiances**

Why did these networks, financed by the Saudis (with American consent, as has been witnessed in Afghanistan and Algeria), revolt against their benefactors? It is because of the pressure of public opinion, the Palestinian question, the presence of other sources of financing (Iraq, Libya), the fierce anti-Western rhetoric of their propaganda—no longer not diverted by the Soviet or communist threat that has disappeared. Money does not guarantee allegiance, and Saudi Arabia has fallen into disgrace.

For the networks which were not linked to the Moslem Brothers, the pressure from the grassroots and the cultural anti-Western tropism of the leaders offer a sufficient explanation (ISF, En-Nahda), the more so since Iraq can often make up for faltering financing. For the Jordanian Moslem Brothers, the Palestinian tropism seems to be the key. For Pakistani Jama'at and its Afghan allies, the rupture with the Americans dates back to 1989: the anti-American diatribes by the Afghan Islamic leader Hekmatyar to the press are not new, and already in October 1990, Hekmatyar had taken positions close to those of Baghdad. Let us not forget that Yasser Arafat had organised in 1989, a meeting in Baghdad



between the representatives of Hekmatyar and of Najibullah, the president of the communist regime of Baghdad.

The choice has not always been easy and many Islamic and fundamentalist circles maintain a certain ambiguity. One can recall the retractions of the Algerian ISF leaders at the beginning of the Gulf crisis. In Afghanistan, the Mudjahidin close to the Egyptian Moslem Brothers (Jamiat-Islami) are pro-Saudi, whereas those close to the Jordanian Moslem Brothers are much more attracted by Saddam Hussein. The Egyptian Moslem Brothers, while still condemning Saddam Hussein, denounce through the voice of Sheikh Abul Nasr the American presence in Saudi Arabia (declaration of January 21, 1991).

Today there is no more strategic backfiring against this neo-fundamentalism, which has become independent from its Saudi sponsors and godfathers. Saudi Arabia lost all credibility among the Moslem masses by calling in Western troops. Moderate governments are obliged to show radical positions because of the pressure of the public opinion (Tunisia, Jordan tomorrow Egypt?). The cultural and psychological gap is growing between the North and that part of the South represented by the Moslem world. And this is not linked to the military episodes of the war in the Gulf.

### References

- <sup>1</sup> - We have here a problem of terminology. If "Islamism" represents the will to interpret Islam more as an ideology than as a religion, there is in fact a return of "Islamism", and one can question whether this movement has survived the death of Khomeini. "Fundamentalism" in the narrow sense, according to the terminology which we use over the last years, indicates rather the will to return to the Shariat without dealing with the question of the state. What identifies the current movements is the return of Islamics to fundamentalist attitudes, whereas the sociological origin of the militants has not really changed. Hence, the term of "neo-fundamentalists", to designate those who have maintained from the Islamist parenthesis a concern for social issues, militant work and action in the field.
- <sup>2</sup> - In the Fall of 1989 in the town of Creil, young women present themselves at high-school wearing the "Islamic kerchief"; the director of the school refuses to let them participate in the classes with their veils on. This affair lead to a large debate in France. In the end, the Minister of Education let the directors and the school councils decide whether to allow or forbid the kerchiefs.
- <sup>3</sup> - For a detailed study of these "new intellectuals", see Gilles Kepel, Yann Richard, *Les nouveaux intellectuels du monde musulman*, Paris, Le Seuil, 1990.
- <sup>4</sup> - See Gilles Kepel, *Les banlieues de l'Islam* (The Suburbs of Islam), Paris, Le Seuil, 1988.
- <sup>5</sup> - See note 2.
- <sup>6</sup> - The Sheikh Hudaybi had for example condemned the more radical positions of Sayyid Qutb. See Olivier Carr, Gérard Michaud, *Les Frères Musulmans* (The Moslem Brothers), Gallimard 1983, p.98. *Mystique et politique: lecture révolutionnaire du Coran par Sayyid Qotb, frère musulman radical* (Mystics and Politics: a Revolutionary Interpretation of the Coran by Sayyid Qotb, radical Moslem Brother), Le Cerf.